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Abstract
With the increasing popularity of the online channel, both consumers and firms are
engaging in more and more multi-channel activities. On the one hand, consumers can integrate
information from searches on both online and offline channels, and then decide on the best
channel to buy from. On the other hand, firms need to consider consumer behavior in different
channels in their strategy design. As a result, cross-channel interactions between consumer
behavior and firm strategy can be within the same channel or across different channels. While
the within-channel interaction has been studied extensively in the previous literature, there is
much less research on the cross-channel interaction. In my dissertation, I add to the
understanding of consumer behavior and firm strategy in the multi-channel environment by
empirically analyzing their cross-channel interactions.
This dissertation consists of three separate but related essays. The first answers the
question: How does consumer behavior affect optimal product portfolio strategies in online
versus offline channels? I develop an empirical model to simultaneously identify the
cannibalization effect (within a brand) and the competition effect (between different brands) in
different retail channels. I further examine how these effects are affected by consumer
preferences. The second essay answers the question: How does a
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firm’s offline strategy affect consumer online behavior? I use a natural experiment to examine
how the awareness and convenience effects from opening new retail stores affect the online
search. The final essay answers the question: How does online banking affect entry/exit of
offline bank branches? I develop and estimate a dynamic entry/exit model examining the
relationship between technological advances and market structure evolution. My counterfactual
analysis shows that the asymmetric reduction in operating costs is the most significant factor
driving recent changes in the U.S. banking industry, followed by increased entry costs and
increased deposits for large banks due to greater online presence. My findings provide important
implications for firms engaging in multi-channel activities.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The emergence and popularity of the online channel change the way consumers search
for information and make decisions in online and offline environments. This has important
implications for firms’ multi-channel strategies and well as the evolution of markets. On the one
hand, consumers can integrate information from searches on both online and offline channels,
and then decide on the best channel to buy from. On the other hand, firms need to consider
consumer behavior in different channels in their strategy design. As a result, the cross-channel
interactions between consumer behavior and firm strategy can be within the same channel or
across different channels as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Interactions between consumers and firms in the multi-channel environment

While the within-channel interaction has been studied extensively in the previous
literature, there is much less research on the cross-channel interaction. In my dissertation, I add
to the understanding of consumer behavior and firm strategy in the multi-channel environment
by empirically analyzing their cross-channel interactions from three perspectives.
In the first essay, I develop an empirical model to simultaneously identify the
cannibalization effect (within a brand) and the competition effect (between different brands) in
different retail channels. I further examine how these effects are affected by consumer
preferences. Our results show that the online market exhibits stronger cannibalization and
1
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competition than the offline channel. Moreover, heterogeneity in consumer search behavior and
brand loyalty explain a significant fraction of the variation in both cannibalization and
competition between the two channels. My findings suggest that firms should offer fewer models
in the online channel and when consumers are highly loyal.
In the second essay, I examine how opening a new retail store affects the cognitive costs
of online search and the physical cost of offline search. I find that, for consumers with prior
experience on the retailer’s website, opening a new store leads to a 68% increase in the number
of visits to the retailer’s website by consumers who live in the broader marketing area of the new
store, while it leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the retailer’s website by
consumers who live in the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the effect of store entry in
the shopping region on decreasing website search is weaker when consumers are more efficient
in using the online channel. My results are robust to corrections for endogeneity in the choice of
new store locations using different matching methods.
In the third essay, I develop and estimate a dynamic entry/exit model examining the
relationship between technological advances and market structure evolution to understand the
relationships between these intriguing phenomena. Despite the rise of consumer online banking,
there has been little reduction in the number of brick and mortar bank branches in the U.S. At the
same time, large national banks have expanded their branch networks at the cost of small local
banks. My findings suggest that the advent of online banking provides significant competitive
advantages to large national banks over small local banks that lower large banks’ offline
operating costs and increase consumer deposits; yet increase entry costs. A counterfactual
analysis shows that the asymmetric reduction in operating costs is the most significant factor
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driving recent changes in the U.S. banking industry, followed by increased entry costs and
increased deposits for large banks due to greater online presence.
In sum, the results presented in this dissertation provide insight into the multi-channel
business models. These studies also contribute to the literature on product portfolio management
and local competition.

3
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Chapter 2

Consumer Preferences, Cannibalization and

Competition: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry
Understanding the degree of cannibalization and competition in online and offline
markets is important to firms’ product line designs. However, few empirical studies have
measured both effects simultaneously or have examined the factors that determine the extent of
cannibalization and competition. In this study, we develop an empirical model to identify
cannibalization and competition effects simultaneously in different markets, and further examine
the impacts of consumer preferences on these two effects in a single integrated framework. Using
data from the U.S. personal computer (PC) industry, we find that the online market exhibits
stronger cannibalization and competition than the offline market. Both effects are significantly
influenced by consumers’ search behavior and brand loyalty. Specifically, more active consumer
search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also amplifies intra-brand
cannibalization. In addition, search has a higher impact on cannibalization than competition.
Stronger consumer brand loyalty mitigates inter-brand competition, but its effect on intra-brand
cannibalization varies for different consumer segments. In markets consisting of more high-end
consumers, the intra-brand cannibalization increases with consumer brand loyalty, while, in
contrast, in markets consisting of more low-end consumers, the intra-brand cannibalization
decreases with consumer brand loyalty. The differences in consumer search and brand loyalty
explain a significant fraction of the variations in both cannibalization and competition between
different PC markets.

4
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2.1

Introduction
Product proliferation is an important component of a firm’s competitive strategy and is

commonly observed in practice. For example, in the personal computer (PC) industry, we often
observe multiple models of desktops or laptops offered by the same firm or brand. In 2001, HP
offered 19 desktop models with varying configurations, and this number increased to 35 in 2008.
Similar phenomena were observed for other PC manufacturers as well. Product proliferation is
not specific to the PC industry. According to Bernard et al. (2006), multiproduct firms account
for more than 90% of the output in the U.S. manufacturing sectors.
Product proliferation has at least two competing effects on firm profitability.1 First, it has
an inter-brand competition effect: when introducing a greater variety of product offerings, a firm
can attract new consumers with heterogeneous tastes and induce consumers to switch from
competitors (Bayus and Putsis 1999). Second, it has an intra-brand cannibalization effect:
products offered by the same firm are often considered by consumers as close substitutes so that
“one product’s customers are at the expense of other products offered by the same firm” (Mason
and Milne 1994, p.163).2
Firms need to consider both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition
effects when designing their product lines (Kadiyali et al. 1998; Ruebeck 2005; Wilson 2011). A
stronger cannibalization effect gives incentives for firms to shorten their product lines, whereas a
fiercer competition between firms may induce them to expand their product lines. Due to the
rapid growth of the online market, the product line design in online and offline markets becomes

1

Other effects such as market expansion are not the focus of this study, but will be controlled in our

analysis.
2

In this study, we assume each firm has a single brand, so we use brand and firm interchangeably. Within
each brand (e.g. Dell) there can be many products (e.g. Latitude E6400, XPS 8500, etc.).
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an increasingly more important issue for multiproduct firms to consider. Earlier work in
information systems suggests some important differences between the online and offline
markets. For example, the online channel has lower search cost (Bakos 1997; Clemons et al.
2002; Ghose and Yao 2011) and menu cost (Bailey 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000)
compared to brick-and-mortar stores. These differences have important implications to firms’
online pricing (Clemons et al. 2002; Ghose and Yao 2011). Recent studies have also started to
examine the implications of this new channel to firms’ product strategy. For example,
Brynjolffson et al. (2011) suggest that the online market creates a long tail in the distribution of
sales by substantially increasing the market shares of niche products. A natural question to ask
following these findings is: how should firms optimize their product offerings online? Should
firms offer more products online than offline given its ability to attract consumers into buying
more niche products? Given that the online and offline markets differ in many key characteristics
that can potentially affect the degree of intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition,
it is important for firms to gauge both cannibalization and competition effects in online and
offline markets and to understand their influencing factors to make optimal product line
decisions.
Our first objective in this study is to empirically measure intra-brand cannibalization and
inter-brand competition and examine whether they vary across online and offline markets. We
develop a unified framework to jointly estimate both cannibalization and competition in different
markets in the U.S. PC industry. We find significant differences in both effects between online
and offline markets. Specifically, the online market exhibits both stronger intra-brand
cannibalization and stronger inter-brand competition than the offline market for the PC industry.

6
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This leads to our second research question: what factors drive intra-brand
cannibalization and inter-brand competition in different markets? In particular, we focus on how
consumer brand loyalty and search behavior influence cannibalization and competition,
respectively. To answer this question, we model both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand
competition as functions of consumer preferences. We find that, consistent with intuition,
stronger consumer brand loyalty reduces inter-brand competition. The impact of brand loyalty on
intra-brand cannibalization, however, varies for different segments of consumers. Specifically,
stronger brand loyalty increases intra-brand cannibalization in markets consisting of more highend consumers (high income, low price sensitivity), but decreases intra-brand cannibalization in
markets consisting of more low-end consumers (low income, high price sensitivity). In addition,
we find that more active consumer search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also
amplifies intra-brand cannibalization to a larger extent, suggesting that more consumer search
before purchase encourages more comparisons within the same brand than between different
brands. The differences in consumer search and brand loyalty explain a significant fraction of the
variations in both cannibalization and competition between different PC markets.
This study makes the following important contributions. First, our study offers a
framework to jointly identify intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition in different
markets as well as the impacts of demand side factors on competition and cannibalization in a
single integrated model, while at the same time controlling for potential endogeneity issue. Prior
studies (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Hui 2004; Watson 2009) have focused on either
cannibalization or competition, but have not measured them simultaneously for different
markets. Our results suggest that both cannibalization and competition vary across online and
offline markets and need to be considered jointly for optimal product line design. Specifically,
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while the higher online competition between firms has been recognized in academic research and
practice, the higher online cannibalization between products within a firm has been largely
overlooked. This could lead to sub-optimal product line design in the online market.
Second, our study highlights important demand side factors (i.e., consumer preferences)
that influence both cannibalization and competition, whereas prior studies (e.g., Thomadsen
2007) have mainly focused on the supply side factors (e.g., product characteristics and pricing).
Our results suggest that consumer brand loyalty and search behavior have significant impacts on
cannibalization and competition, and in addition, that the differences in these consumer
preferences play an important role in explaining the variations in cannibalization and competition
between different markets.
In particular, when drawing implications about the impact of brand loyalty on product
cannibalization, it is important for firms to consider consumers’ brand loyalties in different
segments because their impacts are different. For example, if a market is mainly composed of
loyal consumers from the high-end segment, intra-brand cannibalization can be high and it may
be optimal for manufacturers to offer fewer products to the market. In fact, in our data, we
observe a higher interaction between loyalty and income in the online channel. Because brand
loyalty of high end consumers has a positive impact on cannibalization, the characteristics of the
online population in the PC market can make it more likely for us to observe a higher
cannibalization online.
While prior IS studies have primarily focused on the impact of lowered search cost on
inter-firm competition, we find that the lowered search cost not only affects competition, but also
affects cannibalization. More importantly, our result suggests that search in fact can have a
higher impact on cannibalization than competition. This result has important implications: while
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the increased competition due to lower search cost online may encourage firms to offer more
products to attract consumers, it can increase intra-brand cannibalization to a larger extent,
limiting the optimal number of products to offer. Therefore, the lowered search cost online does
not necessarily favor a longer product line. This can be counter-intuitive since online stores are
often not limited by shelf space or capacity constraints, and it is generally cheaper to host a
greater product variety online. However, a shorter product line online may be optimal if the
higher intra-brand cannibalization online is a major concern.

2.2

Literature Review
Our study is closely related to the literature on product proliferation. Most studies in this

research stream develop theoretical models to analyze firms’ decisions on product quality (Desai
2001; Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984) or on the length of product line (Bayus and Putsis 1999;
Bordley 2003; Liu and Cui 2010; Shugan 1989). When consumers have heterogeneous
preferences over quality, firms have incentives to vertically differentiate their products to meet
the needs of different consumers. Desai (2001) develops a model for duopolistic competition
where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over brand in addition to quality. His results
suggest that the brand preferences of consumers with different quality sensitivities affect intrabrand cannibalization differently. Studies on the length of product line suggest that a longer
product line can lead to more severe product cannibalization and diminishing marginal
contribution to firm performance (Draganska and Jain 2005) or even negative impact on firm
profit (Bayus and Putsis 1999). The effectiveness of product proliferation as a marketing strategy
thus is clearly limited by the extent of product cannibalization. However, there have been few
attempts to study cannibalization, competition and their influencing factors simultaneously,
which is a gap in the literature that this study aims to fill.
9
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Prior studies have, however, studied each of the two effects (cannibalization and
competition) separately. The research stream on product cannibalization has used different
methods to quantify the extent of intra-brand cannibalization. Most papers infer about
cannibalization indirectly from cross-product price elasticity (Berry et al. 1995), or from the
change of firm performance in response to the change in the length of product line (Bayus and
Putsis 1999; Draganska and Jain 2005). Notably Hui (2004) examines a direct measure of intrabrand cannibalization and then links cannibalization to firm brand value. Compared with the
cross elasticity between individual products, this measure indicates the degree of cannibalization
at an aggregate level. Such a single measure is especially suitable to study our research question,
which examines the link between cannibalization and consumer characteristics at the market
level. We thus use similar aggregate-level measures in this study. Our study is different from Hui
(2004) in two aspects: first, we measure not only intra-brand cannibalization but also inter-brand
competition, and second, more importantly, we further investigate the impact of consumer
preferences on both cannibalization and competition in a single integrated model.
The recent research stream on inter-brand competition effect focuses on comparing this
effect between online and offline markets. Most research in this area focuses on the
consequences of lower search costs online and often uses price dispersion as an index of
competition (e.g., Baye et al. 2006; Brynjolfsson et al. 2010; Clemons et al. 2002). Some
researchers suggest that firms should optimize their product line design by offering more
differentiated products in the online market to mitigate online competition (Bar-Isaac et al. 2009;
Kuksov 2004). We capture the effect of consumer search on product competition in our model,
and different from previous studies, we further compare this effect with the impact of consumer
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search on cannibalization and include consumer preference variables to help explain the
differences in both cannibalization and competition between different markets.

2.3

Data Description
Our empirical analyses focus on the U.S. PC industry. We choose the PC industry as the

empirical context for the following three reasons. First, it is a highly competitive market with a
number of major PC makers, each offering a variety of computer models. This combination
allows us to study both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization. Second,
products in the PC industry are vertically differentiated with similar functions, so PC vendors
compete fiercely on product quality, such as CPU speed. This enables us to apply Lancaster’s
characteristics theory of value (Lancaster 1966) in our empirical model. Third, this is a dynamic
industry characterized by frequent new product introductions and quality improvements, which
provide us with more variations in the data that are helpful for parameter identification.
Our data come from two datasets. The first dataset is PC sales data between 2004 and
2008 collected by the International Data Corporation (IDC). For each PC model, IDC records its
manufacturer, form factor (desktop or laptop), CPU, average retail price, and unit sales in each
quarter. The sales data are available for six distribution channels: Internet, retail, direct inbound,
direct outbound, dealer/value-added reseller/systems integrator, and others. In this study, we use
data for the Internet and retail channels only,3 because of two reasons: first, our focus is on
comparing the two channels, and second, these two channels mostly reflect consumer purchases
and therefore can be matched with the information from our second dataset—the Consumer
Technographics Benchmark survey data for the same period from Forrester Research. The

3

Consumer purchases in other channels will fall under an outside option in our demand model presented

later.
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benchmark survey is an annual survey of over 50,000 households in North America, from which
the households from Canada are excluded from our analysis. The survey includes questions
about consumer preferences, general shopping behaviors and purchase decisions for computers,
among other products. Detailed information about consumers’ PC purchases in the survey is used
to match their shopping behaviors to IDC sales data. Specifically, our matching is based on three
factors: year of purchase, form factor (desktop or laptop) and channel of purchase (online or
offline), given that our consumer preference variables will be measured at the market level.
While the IDC sales data allow us to estimate a demand model that quantifies cannibalization
and competition in the PC market, the Forrester survey data help explain how consumer
preferences affect the extent of cannibalization and competition in the same market.
In our study, we restrict our analyses to firms identified in both the IDC sales data and the
Forrester surveys. Our final dataset includes the eight largest PC firms between 2004 and 2008:
Acer, Apple, Dell, Gateway, HP, Lenovo, Sony, and Toshiba. These firms accounted for 77% of
total sales in the PC industry during the period. In addition, we aggregate the quarterly IDC sales
data to a yearly level to match the annual Forrester surveys.

2.4

Empirical Model

2.4.1 Cannibalization and Competition Effects
To address our first research objective that aims to identify both intra-brand
cannibalization and inter-brand competition and compare them across online and offline markets,
we develop an empirical model under the generalized extreme-value (GEV) discrete choice
framework (McFadden 1978). In particular, we consider consumers’ PC purchases for different
form factors (desktop or laptop) and in different channels (online or offline). We thus set up a
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two-level nested logit model as illustrated in Figure 24. In the first level, the four nests
correspond to the four markets identified by form factor and channel combinations: laptoponline, desktop-online, laptop-offline, and desktop-offline. The second level sub-nests include all
the firms competing in the same market, and each sub-nest has all the computer models from the
same firm. With eight firms in our analysis, in total we have 30 sub-nests in the second level
because Toshiba desktops are excluded due to very limited sales.

Figure 2：Nest Structure of Our Two-level Nested Logit Model

Let l index form factor and m index channel. The utility to consumer h from purchasing
PC model i from firm j in nest lm is specified as:5
2
𝑈ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 𝛼𝑝 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
+ 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜀ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

(1)

Here, 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 is the price of the PC model. 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 represents the age of the PC model,
measured as the time elapsed since it was first available in either channel. We include the
quadratic term of 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 to capture any nonlinearity in consumer preferences for product vintage. 𝑏𝑗
is the brand value of firm j. 𝑐𝑖 captures consumer preferences for the CPU used in model i, which

4
5

The rationale behind the choice of our nest structure is explained in detail in Appendix A.
For readability purpose, we suppress all time subscripts.
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is a key indicator for PC quality because it is the most important component in determining the
performance of a PC (Bresnahan et al. 1997; Hui 2004; Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997).6 𝑑𝑙𝑚
stands for the interactions of the form factor dummies with the channel dummies to capture form
factor and channel fixed effects. 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 captures the unobserved product attributes, while 𝜀ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚
captures the idiosyncratic taste of consumer h.
The unconditional market share of PC model i from firm j in nest lm is the product of
three terms:
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ∙ 𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ∙ 𝑠𝑙𝑚 .

(2)

Here 𝑠𝑙𝑚 is the (unconditional) market share of nest lm, 𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 is the market share of firm j
in nest lm, and 𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 is the market share of model i within firm j in nest lm. Following the
generalized extreme-value framework, we have:
𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 =
𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚 =

𝛿
⁄1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚
𝑒 𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚

𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚

(3)

1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 ⁄1−𝜌𝑙𝑚

;

𝐹𝑙𝑚

𝑠𝑙𝑚 = ∑

;

𝐹𝑙𝑚 1−𝜌𝑙𝑚

𝑙𝑚 𝐹𝑙𝑚

1−𝜌𝑙𝑚

(4)

;

(5)

where
2
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑚 = 𝛼𝑝 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
+ 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 ;

(6)

𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚 = ∑𝑖∈𝑗𝑙𝑚 𝑒 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 ⁄1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 ;

(7)

𝐹𝑙𝑚 = ∑𝑗∈𝑙𝑚 𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚 1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 ⁄1−𝜌𝑙𝑚 .

(8)

As a result, the unconditional market share of model i from firm j in nest lm is given by:

6

Because there are over 100 different CPUs in our dataset, it is empirically challenging to estimate a
separate dummy variable for each CPU. Following Gordon (2009) and Sriram et al. (2010), we classify all CPUs
into five categories based on their benchmark scores. Our results are robust to the number of CPU categories.
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𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 =

𝛿
⁄1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚
𝑒 𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚

1−(1−𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 )⁄(1−𝜌𝑙𝑚 )

∙𝐹𝑙𝑚 𝜌𝑙𝑚 ∙∑𝑙𝑚 𝐹𝑙𝑚 1−𝜌𝑙𝑚

.

(9)

Note that 𝐺𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝐹𝑙𝑚 are the inclusive values that consumers expect to receive when
choosing the best option in sub-nest jlm and in nest lm, respectively. They indicate the overall
attractiveness of the corresponding sub-nest or nest.
Following Berry (1994), we can transform Equation (9) into its equivalent linear form:
2
log(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 ) − log(𝑦0 ) = 𝛼𝑝 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 + 𝜑1 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 + 𝜑2 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
+ 𝑏𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑙𝑚 +

𝜌𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ) + 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ) + 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 .

(10)

Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 is the unit sales of model i, and 𝑦0 is the quantity corresponding to the outside
option. To allow for the possibility that the market size may be changing over time, we use a set
of yearly dummies to control for the size of outside option in our estimation process.7
The parameter 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 measures the similarity between the alternatives within sub-nest jlm
perceived by consumers, and thus captures the intra-brand cannibalization within firm j in market
lm. The rationale is that when consumers choose products to maximize their utility, the extent of
competition between products depends on how closely these products are perceived by
consumers. The larger the similarity parameter 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 , the closer the products are perceived, and
the stronger the cannibalization between firm j’s own PC models. This can be seen from
Equation (10) above. Note that log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ) is always negative in the 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 log(𝑆i|𝑗|𝑙𝑚 ) term.
When 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 becomes larger, the sales of each individual product (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 ) will become smaller
given the same market shares within sub-nest jlm, indicating stronger intra-brand

7
Using our regression results, we also examine the evolution of the outside option in our model. We
compare the estimated yearly dummies with the total number of PC models over the years. We find that as the
number of models increased, the size of outside option decreased over the years. This pattern may provide a crude
indication for the market expansion effect. However, given the focus of this study, we do not pursue to investigate
this effect in detail.
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cannibalization. Following the same logic, we consider the parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚 to capture the interbrand competition between firms in market lm since it measures the perceived similarity between
the alternatives within nest lm. The larger the parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚 , the more intense the competition
between different firms within the market.8
To compare cannibalization and competition across online and offline markets, we model
both 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 as functions of the interacted formfactor and channel dummies. We also
include firm fixed effects in the function for 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 . To ensure that 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 are between 0 and
1, we apply a logistic transformation:
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 =

𝜃 +𝜃
𝑒 𝑗 𝑙𝑚
𝜃 +𝜃
1+𝑒 𝑗 𝑙𝑚

;

(11)

𝑒 𝜇𝑙𝑚

𝜌𝑙𝑚 = 1+𝑒 𝜇𝑙𝑚 .

(12)

After estimating 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 , we can then compare these two effects between online and
offline markets to examine whether the cannibalization and competition effects vary in different
markets.

2.4.2 Consumer Preferences
To answer our second research question that aims to examine the impacts of consumer
preferences on cannibalization and competition, we further link 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 to variables
indicating consumer preferences. Literature suggests that there are at least two aspects of

8
To see the connection between our cannibalization parameter and change in sales, we run a simple
simulation according to Equation (10) to see how product sales respond to changes in the number of products at
different values of 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 . By fixing other parameters except the number of products offered by a firm, it shows that,
increasing the number of products, e.g., from 5 to 10, doubles the total sales for the firm when 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 0, but leads to
no gain in total sales for the firm when 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 = 1. Similar insight can be drawn for competition parameter 𝜌𝑙𝑚 . The
detail of the simulation is available upon request.
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consumer preferences related to intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition: brand
loyalty and search behavior.
Multiproduct firms usually differentiate products on quality to serve consumer segments
varying in preferences for quality (Moorthy 1984; Moorthy 1988; Mussa and Rosen 2012). Firms
are concerned, however, about their low-quality product cannibalizing the demand meant for
their high-quality product. The magnitude of this cannibalization is determined by the
substitutability between high-quality and low-quality products. This substitutability is contingent
on the price and quality of each product, while firms’ price and quality decisions are affected by
consumers’ preferences for different brands. The brand loyalties of price-sensitive (low-end) and
quality-conscious (high-end) consumers can have different effects on firms’ price and quality
decisions, which, as a result, affect intra-brand cannibalization differently (Desai 2001). Based
on the results from Desai’s analytical model, if the brand preference of price-sensitive consumers
is higher, the lack of competition between low-quality products from different firms will likely
make them less attractive for the high-end consumers (as a result of firms optimizing both
quality and price), thus mitigating intra-brand cannibalization. Conversely, if the brand
preference of quality-conscious consumers is higher, the lack of competition between highquality products will likely make them less attractive and thus increase the high-end consumers’
incentives to buy the low-quality product, intensifying the intra-brand cannibalization.
Correspondingly, we expect the impact of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization to be
positive in markets that consist of more quality-conscious consumers and negative in markets
that consist of more price-sensitive consumers.
In addition to affecting intra-brand cannibalization, consumer brand loyalty also affects
the competition between brands. Consumers loyal to a brand typically conduct fewer searches for
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alternatives, effectively reducing their consideration set and leading to less brand switching
(Sambandam and Lord 1995). Moreover, loyal customers become less price sensitive
(Krishnamurth and Raj 1991) and less responsive to promotions (Empen et al. 2011; Raju et al.
1990). As a result, stronger brand loyalty can reduce the intensity of inter-brand competition,
which applies to both high-end and low-end consumer segments. Due to a lack of theoretical
support and empirical evidence, we do not consider the difference between high-end and low-end
consumers when modeling the effect of brand loyalty on inter-brand competition.
Consumer search is another factor that may affect both cannibalization and competition.
Consumers usually engage in active prior-purchase search when they are uncertain about the
attributes or prices of alternative products and must gather further information in order to reach a
utility-maximizing choice (Feinberg and Huber 1996; Ratchford 1982). The prior-purchase
search is more important for complex decisions, such as purchases of computers (Bettman 1979).
After filtering the available alternatives, consumers form their consideration sets that include
products that they will consider (Wright and Barbour 1977). Because prior-purchase search may
involve comparing products from different firms as well as comparing products from the same
firm, it has the potential to affect inter-brand competition as well as intra-brand cannibalization.
To capture the impacts of brand loyalty and search behavior on cannibalization and
competition, we further incorporate these consumer preference variables into the functions for
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 :
2

𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 =

𝛽 𝐿 +𝛽 𝐼 +𝛽 𝐿 ∗𝐼 +𝛽 𝐿 ∗𝐼 +𝛽 𝑆 +𝛽 𝑀
+𝜃 +𝜃
𝑒 1 𝑙𝑚 2 𝑙𝑚 3 𝑙𝑚 𝑙𝑚 4 𝑙𝑚 𝑙𝑚 5 𝑙𝑚 6 𝑗𝑙𝑚 𝑗 𝑙𝑚
2

𝛽 𝐿 +𝛽 𝐼 +𝛽 𝐿 ∗𝐼 +𝛽 𝐿 ∗𝐼 +𝛽 𝑆 +𝛽 𝑀
+𝜃 +𝜃
1+𝑒 1 𝑙𝑚 2 𝑙𝑚 3 𝑙𝑚 𝑙𝑚 4 𝑙𝑚 𝑙𝑚 5 𝑙𝑚 6 𝑗𝑙𝑚 𝑗 𝑙𝑚

𝑒 𝛾1 𝐿𝑙𝑚 +𝛾2 𝑆𝑙𝑚 +𝜇𝑙𝑚

𝜌𝑙𝑚 = 1+𝑒 𝛾1𝐿𝑙𝑚 +𝛾2 𝑆𝑙𝑚 +𝜇𝑙𝑚 .

;

(13)

(14)
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Here, 𝐿𝑙𝑚 is the average brand loyalty of consumers who shop for form factor l in
channel m. We use the item “When I find a brand I like, I stick to it” in the Forrester survey to
measure brand loyalty.9 In the literature, brand loyalty has been operationalized from either
behavioral or attitudinal perspectives. Specifically, behavioral loyalty is determined by the
observed outcome, such as repeated purchase (Guadagni and Little 1983; Kahn et al. 1986),
while attitudinal loyalty focuses on consumers’ stated preferences and purchase intentions
(Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001; Jacoby and Kyner 1973). Our measurement falls into the latter
category.
𝐼𝑙𝑚 represents the average income of consumers who shop for form factor l in channel m.
Consumers’ income levels reflect their price sensitivities. High-income (low-income) consumers
are expected to be low (high) in price sensitivities. Thus, if a market has a high (low) average
income, we expect it to be mainly influenced by high-end (low-end) consumers. Given our
earlier discussion that the impact of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization differs across
markets consisting of different consumers, we interact the brand loyalty 𝐿𝑙𝑚 with the average
income 𝐼𝑙𝑚 in both linear and quadratic terms, so that the impact of brand loyalty on
cannibalization may vary at different income levels.
𝑆𝑙𝑚 captures the average consumer preference for prior-purchase search for the
consumers who shop for form factor l in channel m. A consumer’s preference for search is
measured by the survey item about consumer tendency to “research products for purchase” in
the Forrester survey. To control for the impact that the number of models has on product

We also tried using a different survey item “I would pay more for products consistent with an image I
like” to measure brand loyalty and obtained similar results.
9
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cannibalization, we add 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 into our model, which is the ratio of the number of models offered
by firm j to the total number of models in nest lm.

2.5

Estimation
We first replace 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌l𝑚 in Equation (10) with Equations (11) and (12) to answer

our first research question of whether cannibalization and competition vary across markets, and
then replace 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 in Equation (10) with Equations (13) and (14) to answer our second
research question of how consumer preferences affect cannibalization and competition. This
setup jointly estimates cannibalization and competition as well as the impacts of two demand
side factors (search and loyalty) on both cannibalization and competition in a single integrated
framework. This approach is more efficient than a two-step procedure like the one used by Hui
(2004). This setup also allows us to observe the extent of variations in cannibalization and
competition that can be explained by the consumer preference variables included in this study.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the key variables and Table 2 presents their
correlations.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Description

Obs.

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

Unit sales

2,851

65,691

154,819

2

2,160,372

𝑠𝑗|𝑙𝑚

Market share of firm j in nest 𝑙𝑚

2,851

0.20

0.24

0.00*

0.89

𝑠𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚

Market share of model i in sub-nest 𝑗𝑙𝑚

2,851

0.05

0.08

0.00*

0.98

𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

Price (in $1,000)

2,851

0.92

0.48

0.21

5.00

𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙

Product age (in years)

2,851

0.60

1.01

0.00

11.23

𝐿𝑙𝑚

Consumer loyalty

2,851

3.52

0.06

3.36

3.62

𝑆𝑙𝑚

Consumer search before purchase

2,851

0.16

0.04

0.12

0.29

𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚

Percent of models offered by firm j

2,851

0.21

0.10

0.02

0.56

Consumer income (in $10,000)

2,851

5.84

1.04

4.48

8.19

𝐼𝑙𝑚

(* They are shown to be zero because of truncation.)
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡

𝑆𝑖|𝑙𝑚

𝑆𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚

𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙

𝐿𝑙𝑚

𝑆𝑙𝑚

𝐼𝑙𝑚

𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚

𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

1.0000

𝑆𝑗|𝑙𝑚

0.3885

1.0000

𝑆𝑖|𝑗|𝑙𝑚

0.3426

-0.1226

1.0000

𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚

-0.0591

-0.1155

0.1068

1.0000

𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙

0.0725

0.0404

0.1763

-0.0559

1.0000

𝐿𝑙𝑚

0.0628

0.0911

-0.0473

-0.0699

-0.0402

1.0000

𝑆𝑙𝑚

-0.0887

0.0108

0.0976

0.0911

0.0745

-0.2169

1.0000

𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚

-0.0026

0.3239

-0.3376

-0.2836

-0.0023

0.1711

0.0131

1.0000

𝐼𝑙𝑚

0.0514

0.0740

0.2056

0.1517

0.1371

-0.2114

0.6399

0.1763

1.000

Note that in Equation (10), the price 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 may correlate with the error 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 , because
firms’ pricing decisions can be based on some information in 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 that is unobserved to the
econometrician. Moreover, market shares may also be affected by the unobserved product
attributes in 𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 . As a result, both price and market shares can be endogenous in our model. We
use two sets of instruments to ensure consistent estimates of model parameters. Our first set of
instruments uses supply-side cost shifters. Standard differentiated-product models predict that
price is a function of marginal cost, so input prices are often used as instrumental variables for
prices of end products by prior studies (e.g., Draganska and Jain 2005; Chu et al. 2007).
Specifically, we use the Producer Price Index (PPI) for CPUs as an instrument. Given that CPU
is a key input to PC production, the PPI of CPU should be highly correlated with PC prices. On
the other hand, consumer demand for PCs should not be directly affected by CPU prices after
accounting for PC prices. As a result, the PPI of CPU should not be correlated with the error
term in the demand system for PC, making it a valid instrument. We download the PPI data for
the product category of “Microprocessors” from BLS’s website. Our second set of instruments is
derived from the observed attributes of related PC models. Berry (1994) shows that the observed
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attributes of related products are valid instruments for price and within-nest market share in
discrete choice demand models for differentiated products because these attributes are
predetermined, or at least determined before consumers’ evaluations of the unobserved product
attributes are revealed. This type of instruments has been widely used by prior studies (e.g.,
Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995; Hui 2004; Zhu and Zhang 2010). Specifially, we use: (1) the sum
of product age for the other PC models from the same firm with the same form factor in the same
channel; (2) the sum of product age for the PC models from all the other firms with the same
form factor in the same channel. To ensure that we have a sufficient number of instruments, we
interact these two sets of instruments with the combination of firm, form factor, and channel
dummies during the estimation process (Chu et al. 2007; Hui 2004). We have multiple
endogenous variables and therefore multiple first-stage regressions. The average first-stage R2 is
0.6942 and adjusted-R2 is 0.6813.
A linear model with instrumental variables is typically estimated using a standard twostage least squares (2SLS) procedure. However, given the logistics transformations applied on
𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 , the 2SLS estimation procedure is not applicable in our nonlinear setup. Therefore,
we use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The detail of the GMM estimator is
in Appendix B.

2.6

Results

2.6.1 Cannibalization and Competition Effects
Table 3 shows our estimation results. Model M1 corresponds to the model specified in
Equation (10) with 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚 replaced with Equations (11) and (12) respectively. The
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parameter estimates allow us to calculate the average intra-brand cannibalization and the average
inter-brand competition for both online and offline markets.
Table 3: Estimation Results

Description

M1
No Consumer
Preference Variables
(GMM)

M2

M3

Main Model
(GMM)

Linear Link Function
(2SLS)

Utility function
𝛼𝑝 (𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 )

Price

𝜑1 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 )

Product age

2
𝜑2 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
)

Squared product age

-0.8291 ***

-0.3460 ***

-0.3222 ***

0.0122 *

0.0134 ***

0.0106 ***

-0.0002 *

-0.0003 ***

-0.0003 **

Competition
𝛾1 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer loyalty

-6.7689 ***

-0.3172 ***

𝛾2 (𝑆𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer search

6.4832 **

0.3068 **

𝛽1 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer loyalty

-13.5006 ***

-1.4939 ***

𝛽2 (𝐼𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer income

-9.8615 ***

-1.0730 ***

Cannibalization

𝛽3 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer loyalty * income

2.2664 ***

0.2559 ***

2
𝛽4 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚
)

Consumer loyalty * squared income

0.0545 ***

0.0048 ***

14.3093 ***

1.5700 ***

1.3033 ***

0.1384 ***

𝛽5 (𝑆𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer search

𝛽6 (𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 )

Percent of models offered by firm j

Observations
2,851
2,851
2,851
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Due to space limitation,
we have omitted all the coefficients for dummy variables included in Equations (10) - (14), including firm dummies,
interactions of form factor and channel dummies, CPU category dummies, and yearly dummies.

To estimate the difference in cannibalization effect, we first substitute the estimated form
factor, channel, and brand dummies into Equation (11) and calculate the cannibalization effects
σjlm for all the form factor-channel-vendor combinations (listed in Table 4). Then we report the
difference in average σjlm between online and offline channels. Given that we use nonlinear
functions of the estimators to calculate the difference, the p-value is computed based on a Wald
test statistic. To estimate the difference in competition effect, we first substitute the estimated
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form factor and channel dummies into Equation (12) and calculate the four ρlm, one for each form
factor and channel combination (listed in Table 5). We then report the difference in average ρlm
between online and offline channels. Again this difference involves nonlinear functions of the
estimators. We compute the p-value based on a Wald test statistic. We find that the online market
has both higher cannibalization (difference = 0.0722, p-value < 0.001) and higher competition
(difference = 0.0460, p-value < 0.001) than the offline market. This answers our first research
question by showing that both cannibalization and competition differ across online and offline
markets.
Table 4: Cannibalization Parameter for Each Sub-Nest from Model M1
Vendor

Form factor

Acer

Desktop

Acer

Notebook

Apple

Desktop

Apple

Notebook

Dell

Desktop

Dell

Notebook

Gateway

Desktop

Gateway

Notebook

HP

Desktop

HP

Notebook

Lenovo

Desktop

Lenovo

Notebook

Sony

Desktop

Sony

Notebook

Toshiba

Notebook

Online

Offline

Online - Offline

0.9249
(0.0165)
0.7574
(0.0047)
0.9223
(0.0047)
0.7459
(0.0594)
0.9740
(0.0025)
0.8946
(0.0200)
0.9653
(0.0140)
0.8750
(0.0337)
0.9496
(0.0086)
0.8225
(0.0216)
0.9767
(0.0044)
0.8997
(0.0200)
0.5055
(0.0107)
0.3038
(0.0807)
0.9175
(0.0395)

0.7583
(0.0252)
0.6292
(0.0337)
0.7214
(0.0222)
0.6629
(0.0718)
0.8659
(0.0065)
0.6924
(0.0259)
0.8621
(0.0200)
0.8016
(0.0355)
0.8030
(0.0137)
0.7537
(0.0294)
0.9034
(0.0077)
0.8523
(0.0205)
0.1878
(0.0111)
0.2367
(0.0069)
0.8726
(0.0427)

***

24

*

***

***
*
***
*
****
*
***

*

25
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001.

Table 5: Competition Parameter for Each Nest from Model M1
Online

Offline

Online - Offline

0.9765
0.9444
*
(0.0223)
(0.0167)
0.9587
0.8882
***
Notebook
(0.0131)
(0.0222)
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001.
Desktop

Model M2 corresponds to the model specified in Equation (10) with 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑚 and 𝜌𝑙𝑚
replaced with Equations (13) and (14) respectively. The “Competition” section lists the variables
included in Equation (14) that affect inter-brand competition, while the “Cannibalization” section
lists the variables included in Equation (13) that affect intra-brand cannibalization. Using this
model, we find a similar result to that of Model M1 in that the online market has both higher
cannibalization (difference = 0.1428, p-value < 0.001) and higher competition (difference =
0.0557, p-value <0.001) than the offline market.

2.6.2 Consumer Preferences
To answer our second research question, our result of Model M2 shows that both brand
loyalty and consumer search play important roles in influencing cannibalization and competition.
In terms of cannibalization, the coefficient of brand loyalty is negative and significant (𝛽1 = 13.5006, p-value <0.01), whereas the coefficient for the interaction of brand loyalty and income
is positive and significant in both linear (𝛽3= 2.2664, p-value< 0.01) and quadratic terms (𝛽4 =
0.0545, p-value< 0.01). These estimates suggest that brand loyalty has a negative impact on
cannibalization if the average income in the market is low, and the impact is positive if the
average income is high. This is consistent with our earlier argument that brand loyalties of highend and low-end consumers can have opposite effects on intra-brand cannibalization. It is
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26
therefore important to consider consumer composition before drawing conclusions on the effect
of brand loyalty on intra-brand cannibalization.
The coefficient for brand loyalty on inter-brand competition, regardless of income, is
negative and significant (𝛾1 = -6.7689, p-value<0.01), suggesting that stronger consumer loyalty
can mitigate the inter-brand competition. It is consistent with the finding in prior literature that
when consumers are more loyal, they become less price-sensitive and less likely to switch
between brands (Empen et al. 2011; Krishnamurth and Raj 1991; Raju et al. 1990; Sambandam
and Lord 1995).
The coefficient for consumer search is positive and significant for both competition (𝛾2 =
6.4832, p-value<0.05) and cannibalization (𝛽5 = 14.3093, p-value < 0.01). We compare the
marginal effects of search on competition and cannibalization and further find that search
consistently has a higher impact on cannibalization than on competition in both online and
offline markets (p-value<0.01). Accordingly, consumer preference for more prior-purchase
search intensifies both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization. Moreover, more
active search by consumers before purchase not only facilitates the comparison of products
across firms but also amplifies the substitutability of products within a firm to a larger extent. In
addition to the consumer preference variables, the coefficient for 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 is positive and significant
(𝛽6 = 1.3033, p-value<0.01), confirming that a relatively long product line tends to induce higher
product cannibalization.
As a robustness test, Model M3 shows the results from a 2SLS estimation with linear link
functions instead of the logistic transformations in Equations (13) and (14). Our main results
hold qualitatively.
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Now that we have shown that consumer preference variables have significant impacts on
both cannibalization and competition, an additional question is: how much variation in
cannibalization and competition between different markets can be explained by the differences in
consumer preference variables? Using estimated parameters from Model M2, we calculate the
differences in competition and cannibalization effects between online and offline channels as
shown in the first row of Table 6. To see the impact of consumer loyalty and search variables, in
the second row of Table 6, we assume that there was no difference in loyalty and search
variables between online and offline channels (by replacing their values with the overall average
in the market), in which case the differences in competition and cannibalization effects between
the two channels come from the channel and form factor dummies only. We can see that our
loyalty and search variables explain 53.32% of the difference in competition effect and 48.25%
of the difference in cannibalization effect. This finding indicates that our consumer preference
variables play a critical role in explaining the cross-market differences in competition and
cannibalization.
Table 6: Explaining Power of Loyalty and Search Variables
Online - Offline
Competition

Cannibalization

Loyalty and search variables set at observed values

0.0557

***

0.1428

***

Loyalty and search variables set at overall average values
Percentage explained by variations in loyalty and search
variables
Note: ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001.

0.0260

**

0.0739

***

53.32%

48.25%

We also compare the consumer preference variables between online and offline channels
to draw additional implications on their impacts on the differences in cannibalization and
competition between the two channels. We find that consumers who buy online tend to search
significantly more than consumers who buy offline. We do not find a significant difference in
consumer brand loyalty across channels, but the interaction between loyalty and income is higher
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in the online channel due to higher income. This suggests that while the overall higher
competition in the online channel is primarily driven by the difference in consumer search, the
higher cannibalization in the online channel is driven both by the difference in consumer search
and by the differential effect of brand loyalty of consumers with different preferences for quality.
Even though brand loyalty is not statistically different across channels, the higher average
income of the consumers purchasing PCs online suggests a higher consumer preference for
quality, ultimately leading to a higher cannibalization in the online channel.

2.6.3 Discussion
Our results indicate that online markets exhibit stronger competition and cannibalization
than offline markets. While prior work in information systems has primarily focused on how
inter-firm competition differs between online and offline markets, little attention has been paid to
the difference in intra-brand cannibalization between online and offline markets. However, both
cannibalization and competition are important to firms’ online strategies. Our main result that
cannibalization is higher online than offline is consistent with the observation from our data that
as a firm increases its number of model offerings, its total sales increase at a lower rate in the
online market than in the offline market, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Model Free Evidence of Higher Cannibalization Online

There are at least two reasons why cannibalization can be higher online than offline.
First, the online channel has made it a lot easier to search for information. While previous studies
have examined the impact of lowered search cost on inter-firm competition, we argue that the
lowered search cost, not only affects competition, but also affects cannibalization. More
importantly, our result suggests that search in fact can have a higher impact on cannibalization
than on competition. The Internet has provided an unprecedented scale of information covering
almost every aspect of the product and has also made it very easily accessible. This without
doubt intensifies competition between products in the online market, not only across brands but
also within the same brand. Because of the amount of details available for the products, it also
possibly makes it easier for consumers to distinguish products from different firms and recognize
the commonalities between products from the same firm. As a result, while both intra-brand
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cannibalization and inter-brand competition are higher online, cannibalization could be affected
more than competition.
Second, the impact of consumer loyalty on cannibalization can also be different online.
Consumer loyalty is not necessarily lower online. The online channel offers features like
personalized recommendations and one-click purchasing etc. that can increase loyalty for time
conscious consumers. In fact, in our data, we do not find a significant difference in consumer
brand loyalty across channels, but the interaction between loyalty and income is higher in the
online channel due to the higher income. The people who are more prone to online purchase in
the PC market are likely the ones who are more familiar with technology. These people,
compared to the general population, can be relatively more knowledgeable and quality
conscious. Because brand loyalty of high end consumers has a positive impact on
cannibalization, the characteristics of the online population in the PC market make it more likely
for us to observe a higher cannibalization online.
Recognizing the importance of both cannibalization and competition for firm’s online
product strategies, our results also show significant economic impact. For example, we can
compare the percentage increase in a firm’s total sales after introduction of new products
between the online and offline channels through simulations. When we run the simulations, we
assume that all the firms are symmetric and all the products are symmetric. We use the mean
value for each of our predictor variables to simulate what would happen if one firm increased its
number of products. Figure 4a shows the percentage increase in sales as a firm increases its
number of products from 16 (which is the average number of computer models per brand in our
data) to the number indicated on the X axis. Figure 4b shows the incremental percentage increase
in sales if a firm increases its number of products by one assuming its original number of
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computer models is the number indicated on the X axis. Both plots show a significant higher

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

1.25

increase in sales in the offline channel than in the online channel.

16

18

20
22
Number of models
Offline

24

26

Online

1

1.02

1.04

1.06

1.08

1.1

(a) What if the focal firm increases the number of products from 16 to a specific number?

10

15

20
Number of models
Offline

25

30

Online

(b) What if the focal firm increases the number of products by 1 from a specific number?
Figure 4：Comparison between Online and Offline Channels: Percentage Increase in Sales as the
Number of Products Increases
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2.7

Robustness Checks
In this section we explore alternative specifications to check the robustness of our

findings. First, intra-brand cannibalization can be affected by the number of computer models.
Therefore, instead of using the ratio of the number of models offered by firm j to the total
number of models in nest lm, in column M4 of Table 7, we directly use the number of models
offered by firm j in nest lm (𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚 ) to control for the impact of product variety on cannibalization
and use the total number of models in nest lm (𝑁𝑙𝑚 ) to control for the impact of product variety
on competition. Second, as an additional approach to address the concern that search can be
endogenous since consumers are likely to search more when there are more products, in columns
M5 and M6 of Table 7, we instrument the search variable in our main model using the total
number of models in market lm (𝑁𝑙𝑚 ) and meanwhile we control for the impact of product
variety in Equation (13) using either the ratio variable 𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 or the number of models 𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚 . Third,
to explicitly control for cross-channel competition within the same form factor, in column M7 of
Table 7, we modify our two-level nest structure into a three-level nest structure: Level 1 (Form
Factor), Level 2 (Channel), Level 3 (Vendor) and computer models at the bottom. As shown in
Table 7, our main results hold qualitatively in all the robustness checks.
Table 7: Robustness Checks

Description

M4
Number of Models
in Cannibalization
and Competition

M5
M6
IV for Search +
IV for Search +
Ratio of Models in Number of Models
Cannibalization
in Cannibalization

M7
3-Layer Model

Utility function
𝛼𝑝 (𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑚 )

Price

-0.5282 ***

-0.4268 ***

-0.5386 ***

0.0119 ***

0.0133 ***

0.0085 **

-0.2687 ***

𝜑1 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙 )

Product age

2
𝜑2 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑙
)

Squared product age

-0.0002

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0001

Consumer loyalty

-7.5026 **

-6.8631 ***

-5.2698 *

-6.4624 **

0.0043 *

Competition
𝛾1 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 )
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𝛾2 (𝑆𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer search

10.5942 ***

𝛾3 (𝑁𝑙𝑚 )

Number of models

0.0091 ***

6.0018 **

7.6573 ***

6.4238 *

Cannibalization
𝛽1 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer loyalty

-13.5496 ***

-13.3902 ***

-14.1748 ***

-13.0430 ***

𝛽2 (𝐼𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer income

-10.2586 ***

-9.9123 ***

-10.5683 ***

-10.7237 ***

2.6050 ***

2.3405 ***

2.5216 ***

2.4542 ***

-0.0373 ***

0.0483 ***

-0.0535 ***

0.0582 ***

13.4020 ***

15.2805 ***

15.1942 ***

14.4817 ***

𝛽3 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚 )
2
𝛽4 (𝐿𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑚
)

Consumer loyalty *
income
Consumer loyalty *
squared income

𝛽5 (𝑆𝑙𝑚 )

Consumer search

𝛽6 (𝑀𝑗𝑙𝑚 )

Percent of models
offered by firm j
Number of models
offered by firm j

𝛽7 (𝑁𝑗𝑙𝑚 )

1.1467 ***
0.0079 ***

0.0102 ***

Observations
Note: * p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01; *** p-value<.001.

2.8

1.0943 ***

2,851

2,851

2,851

Conclusions
In this study, we develop a unified GEV framework to simultaneously measure both

intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition in online and offline markets as well as
the impacts of search and consumer loyalty on both cannibalization and competition. We find
that both intra-brand cannibalization and inter-brand competition are higher in the online market
than in the offline market, suggesting stronger competition between products both within a brand
and across brands in the online market. While the higher online competition between brands has
been recognized in academic research and practice, the higher cannibalization between products
of the same brand in the online market has been largely overlooked. Given the importance of
both effects in designing optimal product lines, our results highlight the importance for firms to
consider both effects when practicing the product proliferation strategy online. If intra-brand
cannibalization is more pronounced, it may be optimal for firms to offer fewer products online.
This might be the reason why the number of models from HP is consistently smaller in the online
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market than in the offline market. This can be counter-intuitive since online stores are often not
limited by shelf space or capacity constraint, and it is generally cheaper to host a greater product
variety online. However, a shorter product line online may be optimal if the higher intra-brand
cannibalization online is a major concern.
Our results also identify demand-side factors that drive cannibalization and competition
in different markets. Specifically, we find asymmetric effects of brand loyalty on cannibalization
from consumers with different price sensitivities. While higher brand loyalty of high-end
consumers can intensify product cannibalization, higher brand loyalty of low-end consumers can
have the opposite effect. While higher brand loyalty in general mitigates inter-brand competition,
more active consumer search not only intensifies inter-brand competition but also enhances intrabrand cannibalization to a larger extent. We also find that the differences in these consumer
preferences can explain a significant fraction of the variations in both cannibalization and
competition between different markets. These results highlight the need for firms to consider the
impact of consumer loyalty and search behavior on both product cannibalization and competition
when designing their product lines. For example, if the market is mainly composed of loyal
consumers from the high-end segment, it may be optimal for manufacturers to offer fewer
products to the market. Perhaps that is why Apple only offers a few iPhone models, while its
major competitor, Samsung, offers consumers far more options. Since consumer search
adversely affects both inter-brand competition and intra-brand cannibalization, a lower search
cost does not necessarily promote longer product lines, which are often considered effective in
reaching and attracting consumers. The long tail phenomenon may not work well for markets
mainly consisting of loyal, price insensitive consumers.
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This study has a number of limitations that provide opportunities for future research.
First, we focus on the PC industry which is a high-technology durable product category. Future
research can apply the same framework to examine cannibalization and competition in other
industries, such as consumer package goods. While the nest structure and the degree of priorpurchase search or brand loyalty may vary in different industries, the mechanisms by which
search and loyalty affects cannibalization and competition, and in turn the direction of our results
on how search and loyalty affect cannibalization and competition are expected to be the same.
Second, consumer preference is a broad concept and encompasses various dimensions. In this
study, we look at only brand loyalty and consumer search, and the survey items we use to
construct our variables also may not fully capture these consumer preferences. It will be
interesting for future research to examine alternative ways to measure brand loyalty and
consumer search and to investigate other dimensions of consumer preference and their effects on
market competition and product cannibalization. Lastly, it would also be interesting for future
research to incorporate unobserved consumer heterogeneity into the model when examining the
impacts of consumer preferences on product cannibalization and firm competition.
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Chapter 3

Retail Store Entry and Online Consumer Search: The

Role of Awareness versus Convenience Effects
Relatively little research explicitly considers how a firm’s channel decisions affect
consumers’ tradeoffs between the cognitive costs of online search and the physical costs of
visiting a retail store. We argue that opening a new retail store affects both cognitive and
physical search costs, but that the magnitude of these effects depends on the location of the
consumer relative to the new store, and consumers’ characteristics. As a result, retail store entry
may shift consumers’ online behaviors differently. We test these ideas by examining how the
opening of multiple retail stores on the same day by a major retailer affects consumer search
behavior on the retailer’s website. For consumers with prior experience on the retailer’s
website, we find that opening a new store leads to a 68% increase in the number of visits to the
retailer’s website by consumers who live in the broader marketing area of the new store, while it
leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the retailer’s website by consumers who live in
the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the effect of store entry in the shopping region
on decreasing website search is weaker when consumers are more efficient in using online
channel. In addition to the total number of online sessions, consumers change their within
session behaviors after the offline store entry.

36

37

3.1

Introduction
Most research on the effect of firm behavior on consumer information search has focused

on the physical search costs of gathering information (Balasubramanian, 1998; Forman, Ghose,
& Goldfarb, 2009). Relatively little research considers how firm behavior affects consumer
tradeoffs between the physical costs of offline search (as determined by the physical effort
involved in visiting a retail store; (Balasubramanian, 1998; Moorthy, Ratchford, & Talukdar,
1997) and the costs of online search (as determined by the effort to acquire and process online
information; (Hoque & Lohse, 1999; Ratchford, Lee, & Talukdar, 2003). We argue that opening
an offline store can increase or decrease the attractiveness of the retailer’s online store depending
on where the consumer lives. In other words, we propose that offline stores can have
complementary as well as substitution effects on online search behavior. For consumers who live
in the nearby shopping region, store entry can decrease online search by making offline search
more convenient (a substitution effect). However, for consumers store entry can increase online
search by creating greater awareness of the retailer’s brand (a complementary effect). Further,
we propose that the impact of offline store entry depends on consumer-specific characteristics
such as their efficiency of using the online channel.
We test these ideas using a unique dataset that combines the online search behavior of a
representative sample of US consumers, and census data, with information on the opening of 64
new Kohl’s retail stores in October 2006. We compare changes in the online search behavior of
consumers living in areas that experience store entry, with that of consumers living in areas with
no new store openings. In other words, we treat store openings as a natural experiment to
examine how offline store entry affects online search behavior and how this effect is influenced
by consumer-specific characteristics.
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We find that for consumers with prior experience on the retailer’s website, opening a new
store leads to a 68% increase in the number of visits to the retailer’s website when a new store
enters the broader marketing area, while it leads to a 49% decrease in the number of visits to the
retailer’s website when the new store enters the nearby shopping region. More interestingly, the
effect of store entry in the shopping region on decreasing website search is weaker when
consumers are more efficient in using the online channel. In addition to the total number of
online sessions, consumers change their within session behaviors after the offline store entry.
Although theoretical analyses suggest complementary as well as well as substitution
effects of adding new channels (e.g., Lal & Sarvary, 1999), empirical research has generally
found that the offline channel competes with the firm’s online channel (Anderson, Fong,
Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). In addition, prior research has focused on
purchase rather than search behavior (Anderson, Fong, Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Avery,
Steenburgh, Deighton, & Caravella, 2012; Forman, Ghose, & Goldfarb, 2009; Venkatesan,
Kumar, & Ravishanker, 2007; Zettelmeyer, 2000). Understanding the impact of offline store
entry on online search is important because many consumers use the Internet to search for
product information prior to offline purchase (Verhoef, Neslin, & Vroomen, 2007). Extant
research has also tended to focus on differences in the physical costs of search, as determined by
the consumer’s location relative to the retailer, rather than accounting for differences in the
consumer’s prior experience with a retailer and their efficiency in using a particular channel. By
accounting for factors that affect the costs of online and offline search, we add to prior research
by identifying when, and for which consumers, opening a physical store has complimentary
versus substitutive effects on online search behavior.
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From a managerial standpoint, our results suggest that fears about cannibalization of the
online market by offline markets may be overstated. Depending on where consumers live, as
well as their efficiency in using the online channel, store entry may increase online search for
some consumers while decreasing online search for others. Our results also point to the need to
consider the online channel when making decisions about the physical channel. Understanding
how specific types of consumers respond to new store openings has implications for store
location choices and direct advertising decisions. For example, in addition to considering
consumer demographics, shopping, and travel behavior when choosing store locations, a retailer
should account for the potential benefits of attracting consumers who live in the broader
marketing area to the retailer’s website. Similarly, cross-channel effects of entry decisions should
be taken into account when assessing the role of each channel in driving sales.

3.2

Theoretical Framework
Despite the dramatic growth of the Internet, consumers continue to rely on traditional retail

stores for the majority of their shopping (US Census2010). Prior research based on interviews
with consumers suggests that the offline channel is generally preferred to the online channel for
search as well as purchase (Frambach, Roest, & Krishnan, 2007). Although the Internet offers a
number of advantages for consumer search, including more detailed product information, greater
product variety, ease of price comparisons, and the ability to search for products from home
(Alba et al., 1997; Anderson, Fong, Simester, & Tucker, 2010; Zettelmeyer, 2000), it has several
disadvantages. For example, evaluating products may be difficult online (Kambil & Van Heck,
1998; Overby & Jap, 2009). Further, consumers may vary in their ability to effectively utilize the
online channel (Bapna, Goes, Gupta, & Jin, 2004). Traditional retail stores allow consumers to
touch and feel products and obtain face-to-face help from a salesperson (Brynjolfsson, Hu, &
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Rahman, 2009). In addition, through their physical location and investments in real property,
retail stores enhance awareness and trust that the store will be around in the future to service
consumer needs (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).
Consequently, we argue that the effect of store entry on online search is likely to depend on
how store entry affects consumer awareness of the retailer and the relative convenience of using
each channel. More specifically, we distinguish between the effects of new store entry on
consumers who live in the store’s marketing region and effects on consumers who live in the
store’s narrower shopping area. For simplicity we refer to these as awareness and convenience
effects, respectively. Marketing regions are larger and defined by high degrees of social and
economic integration, while shopping areas are smaller and are defined by the distance the
consumer typically travels to visit an offline store.

3.2.1 The Convenience Effect
Prior research suggests that, in the absence of search and travel costs, consumers often prefer
to visit physical stores (Frambach, Roest, & Krishnan, 2007). In particular, the online channel is
seen as an inferior channel for product information because of the inability to touch and feel
products and obtain face-to-face help from a salesperson (Alba et al., 1997; Verhoef, Neslin, &
Vroomen, 2007). Further, a physical store engenders trust in the retailer by serving as an
observable signal of quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). Although consumers may be willing to
spend more time traveling for hedonic than utilitarian goods (Okada, 2005), or for greater
proportional differences in prices (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), there is a point at which the
costs of traveling to the physical store exceed the perceived costs of obtaining information
through the online channel. It is well known that consumers primarily visit stores that are located
in the vicinity of their residence (Bell, Ho, & Tang, 1998; Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000; Huff,
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1964). Thus, consumers with a new offline store entry within their narrower shopping area are
more likely to shift their search for product information from the online to the retail store, and
therefore less likely to visit the retailer’s online store.
Hypothesis H1: For households located within the shopping region of a retailer’s new
offline store, store entry will reduce search at the retailer’s website.

3.2.2 The Awareness Effect
Store entry into the marketing region where a consumer lives increases consumer awareness
of the retailer as the consumer is more likely to see the physical store, be exposed to word-ofmouth about the retailer from other consumers, encounter references to the physical store in
Internet and directory searches, and be exposed to advertising for the offline store. For example,
retailers often run television advertising and produce newspaper circulars in areas where offline
stores are located (Kohl's Corporation, 2010). In other words, the presence of an offline store
provides the consumer with greater exposure to vivid information that is more accessible in
memory and enhances consumer confidence in the retailer (Berger & Mitchell, 1989; Herr,
Kardes, & Kim, 1991). This should increase the likelihood that the consumer considers the
retailer when searching for product information online.
New offline store entry in the consumer’s marketing region should also reduce information
gathering and evaluation costs associated with consideration. In particular, because exposure to
the store and its products may be incidental rather than effortful, the presence of a physical store
should lower the costs and increase the likelihood of gathering information (Shapiro, Macinnis,
& Heckler, 1997). Incidental exposure should also lower information search costs by allowing
consumers to use memory-based consideration processes (Nedungadi, 1990); this should also
enhance the likelihood of consideration (Kardes, Kalyanaram, Chandrashekaran, & Dornoff,
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1993). Store entry should also reduce the cost of evaluating information (Shugan, 1980) by
enhancing the consumer’s ability to assess the type of products the retailer offers; this should
make it more likely for consumers to consider the retailer when searching for product
information online (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990).
Finally, investing in a new offline store should enhance the consumer’s trust in the retailer by
serving as an observable signal of quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). In addition, since consumers’
online behavior may be influenced by other consumers who live in the same neighborhood or zip
code (Bell & Song, 2007; Forman, Ghose, & Wiesenfeld, 2008; Jank & Kannan, 2005), new
store entry should allow consumers to learn from the experience of others. The trust engendered
through physical presence, the ability to talk to “a real person,” and the ability to learn from
other consumers should make consumers more likely to consider the retailer when shopping for
products. For all these reasons—greater awareness, greater information accessibility, lower
evaluation costs, and increased trust—store entry in the marketing region where the consumer
lives should make consumers more likely to consider the retailer when shopping for products.
This greater likelihood of being considered should increase consumer search on the retailer’s
website.
Hypothesis H2: For households located within the marketing region of a retailer’s new
offline store, store entry will increase search on the retailer’s website.

3.2.3 The Moderating Role of Consumer-Specific Characteristics
In addition to being affected by the consumer’s location relative to the new store, the
effect of store entry on search behavior should also depend on consumer-specific characteristics:
the consumer’s efficiency in using the online channel and the consumer’s experience to the
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retailer. The first should affect the relative reduction in perceived offline versus online search
costs. The second should affect the awareness effect in considering the retailer.
We have argued that consumers make tradeoffs between the costs associated with
searching the online channel and the physical search costs associated with traveling to the
physical store. We have also argued that, for consumers living in the narrow shopping region of
the new store, store entry reduces the perceived physical costs of search thereby lowering the
appeal of visiting the retailer’s website. This effect should be greater for those who face higher
search costs (i.e., are less efficient) when using the online channel. For such consumers, the
reduced physical costs of visiting the new retail store are likely to be lower than the costs of
online search, and they are more likely to substitute online search with visiting the retail store. In
contrast, consumers who are more efficient at using the online channel are likely to search (and
shop) online simply out of habit, obtain hedonic benefits from online search, and browse
multiple retailers online when searching for product information. Such consumers are less likely
to be affected when a retail store opens in their shopping region. That is, the effect of store entry
in reducing online search by those living in the shopping region of the store should be weaker for
consumers who are more efficient in using the online channel.
Hypothesis H3: The effect of new store entry in the narrow shopping region, on
decreasing the likelihood of visit to the retailer’s website, will be lower for consumers who are
more efficient in using the online channel.
We have also argued that store entry will enhance the awareness of the retailer. That is,
incidental exposure to the retailer through the offline store increases the likelihood of inclusion
in the consideration set of the consumer. This effect should be stronger for consumers who have
not visited the retailer’s website before and were less aware prior to store entry. In contrast,

43

44
experienced consumers are more likely to already have the retailer in their consideration set, and
further incidental exposure to the retailer should have less effect on increasing awareness for
these consumers.
Hypothesis H4: The effect of new store entry in the broader marketing area, on
increasing the likelihood of visit to the retailer’s website, will be lower for consumers who have
used the retailer’s online channel.

3.3

Data

3.3.1 Search Behavior
Table 8 summarizes the data sources used in this research. Our primary data source for
consumer browsing is the comScore Media Metrix 2006 dataset of website visitations.
ComScore recruits a large random sample of Internet users (88,814 households in the 2006
dataset) and installs a program on each user’s computer that tracks their Internet usage over the
entire year. The data set contains the name of every domain (website) visited, a time stamp for
the visit, the number of pages visited within the domain, and the total time spent on the domain
during that visit. Page-level data is not disclosed to protect consumer privacy. The data set also
contains demographic information for each household in the panel including zip code, income,
education, number of children, and Internet connection speed.
Table 8: Data Sources
Data

Data Source

Details

Consumer Browsing

comScore Media Metrix 2006

Website visitations of 87,773 households over a span of
one year (2006). Details available at www.comscore.com

Kohl’s store locations
and store openings

Manually collected from
Kohl’s website and news
sources

The location of 817 Kohl’s stores in 45 states in 2006
including location of 64 stores that opened on October 5
and 3 stores that opened on November 15, 2006

Geo-demographic
Information

The U.S. Census Bureau
(http://www.census.gov/)

Zip code level information, including, including
percentage of high school graduates, percentage of
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bachelor degrees, median income, population, number of
establishments, percentage of female, and population
density

ComScore data have been used in prior research (Huang, Lurie, & Mitra, 2009; Moe &
Fader, 2004; Montgomery, Li, Srinivasan, & Liechty, 2004). Unlike server-side logs (Bucklin &
Sismeiro, 2003; Nicholas, Huntington, Jamali, & Dobrowolski, 2007), or aggregate-level data
(Forman, Ghose, & Goldfarb, 2009), comScore provides information at the household level over
time, as well as household demographics, and is not limited to a single domain or website. Since
the data allow us to observe actual online browsing, we avoid the recall problems associated with
assessing product search through consumer surveys.

3.3.2 Store Entry and Location
To evaluate the impact of offline store entry on online browsing behavior, we focus on
the simultaneous opening of multiple stores by the well-known retailer Kohl’s. At the end of
2006, there were 817 Kohl’s stores located in 45 states. Sixty-four of these stores opened on the
same day, October 5, 2006. Three additional stores opened in mid-November of 2006 and we
dropped all households in the marketing and shopping regions of these stores from the data set
because we did not have a sufficient period of post store-entry observations for these households.
We calculated the distance between the households in the comScore data set and the nearest
Kohl’s store based on their zip codes.
We focus on the retailer Kohl’s for two reasons. First, Kohl’s opened a large number of
new stores on a single day in 2006. This natural experiment allows us to evaluate the impact of
offline store entry on online browsing behavior while controlling for consumer heterogeneity and
time-varying effects such as seasonality. Second, most of the products sold by Kohl’s (such as
shoes, apparel, home furniture and home accessories) can be classified as search goods (Nelson,
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1970, 1974). This is important since previous research has found important differences in
consumer online browsing behavior between experience and search goods (Huang, Lurie, &
Mitra, 2009). In addition, because the Kohl’s website and stores carry almost identical products
(Kohl’s 2010), the effects we observe are likely due to differences between channels of
distribution rather than product lines. Further, based on the comScore transaction data, over 90%
of the online orders at the Kohl’s website in 2006 were for apparel, shoes and similar products.
The focus on a single retailer and a homogeneous set of products reduces concerns about retailer
and product-level heterogeneity.

3.3.3 Online Channel Efficiency
We capture consumers’ efficiency in using the online channel following Johnson et al.
(2003), who show that improvements with practice at performing online shopping tasks are
linear in the log-log space. More specifically, they empirically demonstrate that log(T) = log(B)  Log(N), where T is the time required to complete a task, N is the number of trials, and B is the
baseline intercept term (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2003, pp. 63). To capture consumers’
efficiency in using the online channel, we define Page_timei as the time required by consumer i
to cognitively process a page of online information at the beginning of our study period (July
2006), and we calculate it as follows. We first estimate the iand i coefficients in the equation:
log(Tiv) = i - i*log(v) through random coefficient models, where Tiv is the time spent per page
by consumer i during the vth visit to any retailer website in the same genre as Kohl’s during the
first six months of 2006. We then use the estimated iand i coefficients to calculate the
predicted time spent per page of online information by consumer i at the start of our study
period. That is, Page_timei = exp(i + i*log(Ni)) where Ni is the cumulative number of prior
visits to retailer websites at the beginning of our study period (July 2006) by consumer i. Thus,
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Page_timei predicts the speed at which consumer i can process a page of online information at
the beginning of our study period. In our following empirical analysis, we use -1 *
log(Page_timei) as the proxy for consumer efficiency in using the online channel (Johnson,
Bellman, & Lohse, 2003), which means the less time used to process the information in one web
page, the higher efficiency for a consumer.

3.4

Research Methodology

3.4.1 Natural Experiment Design
We take the offline store entry of Kohl’s as a natural experiment to draw inference on
how consumers change their online behaviors. One of the advantages with natural experiment
design is that we can control for unobserved events that coincide with the opening of new offline
stores, but may affect consumer online behaviors. For example, if there were any nationwide
economic fluctuations, they may intensify or attenuate the effect of new store entry. These
uncontrolled events do not pose any problems to the identification of treatment effects in our
natural experiment design because both treatment and control groups will suffer from the same
effect. In addition, the use of natural experiment allows us to control the seasonal fluctuations of
consumer search behaviors. It is critical for our study because our data conver the shopping
season of Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.
Empirically, we select and categorize households into two treatment groups and one
control group based on the entry (on October 5, 2006) of new Kohl’s stores within the shopping
and marketing regions defined later (details are shown in Table 9). To make the groups as
comparable as possible, and cleanly assess the impact of store entry, we limit our analysis to
areas where there were no nearby Kohl’s stores within the marketing region prior to Fall 2006.
The control group consists of households that did not have any Kohl’s stores within their
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marketing and shopping regions for the entire year. The first treatment group (marketing entry)
had no Kohl’s stores within the marketing or shopping regions prior to October 5th 2006, and
had one or more Kohl’s stores located in their marketing region (but outside their shopping
region) after October 5th 2006. Likewise, the second treatment group (shopping entry) had no
Kohl’s stores within their marketing or shopping regions prior to October 5th 2006, but had one
or more Kohl’s stores located in their shopping (and consequently marketing) region after
October 5th 2006.
Table 9: Control and Treatment Groups

Groups

Number of Stores
before Oct. 5, 2006
Marketing
Shopping
Region
Region

Number of Stores
after Oct. 5, 2006
Marketing
Shopping
Region
Region

Description

Control

0

0

0

0

No offline stores in the
marketing or shopping area for
the whole year

Marketing
Entry

0

0

≥1

0

Offline store entry in the
marketing (but not shopping
area) in October 2006

Shopping
Entry

0

0

≥1

≥1

Offline store entry in shopping
area (and hence also in the
marketing) in October 2006

In addition, we separate consumers in our data set into two groups according to whether
they visited the Kohl’s retail website during 2006. Our study period consists of the last six
months (July–December) of 2006 and we use the first six months (January–June) of the year to
calculate variables related to the consumer’s prior experience at Kohl’s and efficiency in online
information search.

3.4.2 Marketing and Shopping Regions
We define the marketing region of an offline store, which captures the awareness effect of
offline store presence, according to its distance to consumers. According to the findings by
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(Zentner, Smith, & Kaya, 2013), the impact of offline store on consumers’ behaviors on the
retailer’s website diminishes with the distance of the offline store. As a baseline analysis, we use
50 miles in the definition of marketing region for an offline store, but we have tested our results
to be robust to alternative distances. This is also the strategy used by (Gallino & Moreno, 2014),
which assumes the marketing region to be a 50 miles circle centered at the offline store.
The shopping region of an offline store, which captures the substitution effect of offline store
presence on online browsing behavior, is determined based on the average distance that a
consumer is likely to travel to visit an offline store. While distance is widely acknowledged to be
an important predictor of offline store visits (Bell, Ho, & Tang, 1998; Brynjolfsson & Smith,
2000), there are few estimates of the average distance that a consumer is willing to travel to shop
at a store, and such estimates vary by product type and consumer beliefs about travel time (Kang,
Herr, & Page, 2003; Murdie, 1965). For example, Murdie (1965) estimates that most customers
purchase shoes (a product category that is similar to the products purchased from Kohl’s
website) from stores that are located within 10 miles of their residence. The U.S. Department of
Transportation provides a similar estimate of 7 miles for the average distance a consumer travels
to shop at a retail store (US Department of Transportation2008). Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000)
estimate that the average distance that a consumer travels to purchase books and CDs is 5.4
miles, also consistent with a maximum distance of 10 miles to purchase at an offline store.
Accordingly, we use a distance of 10 miles from the offline store location to define the shopping
region. Since Kohl’s stores are located in large metropolitan areas, the shopping region is
contained within the marketing region for almost all households in the sample.
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3.4.3 Model Specification
Our primary interest is to understand how an entry of offline store affects consumer
search in the retailer’s website, and how consumers’ characteristics moderate such a shift in their
online behaviors. Hence, we include both the indicators for store entry in marketing and
shopping regions, and their interactions with consumer prior visits and online efficiency in the
model. Finally we specify the model as:

Yit  i  1 * SHPit   2 * MKTit  3 * PriorVisiti * SHPit   4 * PriorVisiti * MKTit
 5 * SHPit * Efficiencyi   6 * Montht   7 * PriorVisiti * Montht   it

(1)

In Equation (1), Yit represents the number of visits for consumer i in week t on
Kohls.com. SHPit is an indicator for the store entry within the shopping region of consumer i ,
which is set to be zero before October 6th. Similarly, MKTit is an indicator for store entry in the
marketing region. PriorVisit is another indicator for consumers who have visited Kohls.com
between January and June in 2006. As a result, 1 and  2 represent the effects of store entry on
consumers without any experiences on Kohls’s website, while  3 and  4 capture the
incremental effects for experienced consumers.  5 tests how consumers’ online efficiency
moderates the effect of store entry within the shopping regions.  6 and  7 capture the
seasonality effects. In addition, we add fixed effects i to control for consumer heterogeneity
from unobserved characteristics, such as income, education, etc.

3.4.4 Matching
A possible concern with the nature experiment design is that Kohl’s location choices for
new offline stores are not random. Although we have partially controlled for individual level
heterogeneity in Equation (1) through the consumer level constant 𝛽𝑖 since we are using panel
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data methods. However, there may be systematic differences between consumers in locations
where Kohl’s opens new stores (the marketing entry and shopping entry groups in Table 2)
versus consumers in other locations (the control group in Table 2). For example, retailers are
more likely to open new stores in regions with more favorable geo-demographic conditions, such
as more consumers with higher purchase power. Unfortunately, our natural experiment cannot
rule out the effect of such systematic differences on consumers’ online search behaviors.
Thus, following the recent research in marketing(Wangenheim & Bayón, 2007), we apply
matching methods in our empirically study. The objective of matching method is to formulate a
control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment groups based on covariates that may
be correlated with Kohls’s store entry decisions and consumer search behaviors. Following
Avery et al. (2012), we match the control and treatment groups at the zip code level. Our
matching process involves the following two steps.
We first construct a large pool of zip codes as the candidates for the control group. This
pool constitutes of all the areas in America (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) without a Kohl’s
store throughout the year of 2006. Then we collect the geo-demographic information for all the
zip codes in the pool, including percentage of high school graduates, percentage of bachelor
degrees, median income, population, number of establishments, percentage of female, and
population density. We also include the number of clothing stores and department stores as the
proxy for competition against Kohl’s in these zip codes.
Then we quantitatively match each zip code in the treatment group with zip codes in the
pool created in the first step using all the eight variables as geo-demographic information.
Because there are various algorithms in applying matching method, and researchers in marketing
have just applied the matching method in marketing (Wangenheim & Bayón, 2007), there is no
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conclusive answer to which algorithms is the best. Thus we test four widely used algorithms and
report the results in the next section.
The nearest neighbor matching algorithm selects the best zip code in the control group
pool for each individual zip code in the treatment based on a pre-defined distance measure
between the two zip codes. Here, the distance measure is based on the probability regression of
store entry on the eight selected covariates.
The optimal matching algorithm(Hansen, 2004) is an extension to nearest neighbor
procedure. While nearest neighbor algorithm tries to find the closest control match for each
treated unit at each step, it does not try to minimize a global distance measure. On the contrary,
the optimal algorithm finds the matched control group with the minimum average distance across
all the matched pairs.
The full matching algorithm(Hansen, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2002) is a kind of
subclassification algorithm, which first form subclasses from the candidate pool such that in each
of them the distribution of (rather than the exact values) of covariates for the treated and control
groups are as similar as possible. Different from other matching algorithms, a fully matched
sample is composed of matched sets each of which contains one treated zip code unit and one or
more control zip codes. As a result, the full matching procedure tries to use all the candidates
except those who are outside the range of common support. In addition, full matching is optimal
which minimizes the estimated distance measure between each treated subject and each control
subject within each subclass.
The genetic matching algorithm(Abadie & Imbens, 2006; Diamond & Sekhon, 2013)
uses the genetic searching technique developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This algorithm
tries to find a set of weights for each covariate such that optimal balance is achieved after
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matching, where the balance is determined by two different tests: paired t-tests for binary
variables and a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for category and continuous variables.
After matching, we include all the households in the matched zip codes into the control
groups. With matching method, we can isolate the effect of store entry by ruling out possible
alternative explanations for the change of consumer search behaviors because of the self-location
of Kohl’s in their store locations. Table 10 shows the comparison of geo-demographic variables
before and after the matching. We can see the treatment and control groups are much similar in
terms of the used covariates after matching.
Table 10: Comparison of Geo-Information Before and After Full Matching
Mean
(Treatments)
%High School
%Bachelor
Median Income
Population
# of Establishments
# of clothing stores
# of Department Stores
Population density
%Female

3.5

82.8045
18.7841
46411
12135
51.5793
6.5504
0.4107
661.4314
0.5089

Before Matching
Mean
Difference
(Control)
82.2748
0.5297
17.8685
0.9156
42184
4227
9454
2681
44.3650
7.2142
5.6074
0.9431
0.3451
0.0655
457.9833
203.4481
0.5049
0.0041

After Matching
Mean
(Control)
Difference
82.7625
0.0419
18.9450
-0.1608
46525
-114
12092
43
51.1167
0.4625
6.4481
0.1023
0.4078
0.0029
727.0021
-65.5707
0.5086
0.0003

Empirical Results
Table 11 and Table 12 show descriptive statistics for variables in the empirical models

and their corresponding correlations. Since the data set will be different for different matching
methods, we list here the summary statistics from the results using full matching algorithm. Our
empirical analysis is based on the last six months of the year (July–December 2006) with weekly
time buckets, while browsing data from the first six months (January–June 2006) are
incorporated in the calculation of consumers’ prior experience on Kohl’s website.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics
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Standard
Deviation

Obs.

Mean

Number of visits to Kohl’s
website in week i

164,700

0.0068

0.1070

0

10

Pagesit

Average pages / visit

164,700

0.0865

2.2408

0

32

Durationit

Average duration / visit
(Minutes)

164,700

0.0395

1.056

0

17

SHPit

Shopping entry

164,700

0.0778

0.2680

0

1

MKTit

Marketing entry

164,700

0.2503

0.4332

0

1

PriorVisiti

Prior visits to Kohl’s website

164,700

0.0421

0.2009

0

1

Efficiencyi

Efficiency in using online
channel

164,700

0.3031

0.3386

-0.9338

1.364

Yit

54

Min

Max
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix

Yit
Number of visits to
Kohl’s website

Yit

Pagesit

Durationit

SHPit

MKTit

PriorVisiti

1.00

Average pages / visit

0.41
(0.00)

1.00

Average duration /
visit (Minutes)

0.40
(0.00)

0.83
(0.00)

1.00

SHPit

Shopping entry

0.02
(0.00)

0.01
(0.00)

0.01
(0.00)

1.00

MKTit

Marketing entry

0.03
(0.00)

0.02
(0.00)

0.02
(0.00)

0.50
(0.00)

1.00

0.10
(0.00)

0.06
(0.00)

0.07
(0.00)

0.00
(0.37)

-0.01
(0.01)

1.00

0.03
0.02
(0.00)
(0.00)
Note: Significance levels in parentheses.

0.01
(0.00)

0.06
(0.00)

0.01
(0.00)

0.14
(0.00)

Pagesit
Durationit

Visits to Kohl’s
PriorVisiti Prior
website

Efficiencyi

in using
Efficiencyi Efficiency
online channel

1.00

Table 13: Number of Visits the Online Store
Matching
Variable

No Matching
Full

Genetic

Nearest

Optimal

1

SHPit

-0.0020
(0.0048)

-0.0019
(0.0045)

-0.0019
(0.0045)

-0.0019
(0.0047)

-0.0019
(0.0053)

2

MKTit

0.0024**
(0.0010)

0.0021*
(0.0011)

0.0039***
(0.0012)

0.0020*
(0.0011)

0.0013
(0.0014)

3

PriorVisiti * SHP

-0.0312***
(0.0082)

-0.0321***
(0.0078)

-0.0321***
(0.0078)

-0.0321***
(0.0081)

-0.0321***
(0.0091)

4

PriorVisiti * MKTit

0.0465***
(0.0050)

0.0606***
(0.0056)

0.0408***
(0.0060)

0.0533***
(0.0053)

0.0397***
(0.0066)

5

SHPit * Efficiencyi

0.0116
(0.0071)

0.0116*
(0.0067)

0.0116*
(0.0068)

0.0116*
(0.0069)

0.0116*
(0.0069)

6

Montht

Included

7

PriorVisiti * Montht

Included

Number of obs.
Number of households

# of Zip codes

344,979

164,700

138,375

244,242

151,416

12,777

6,100

5,125

9,046

5,608

Shopping Entry

130

128

Marketing Entry

571

566

Control

2,787

694

55

517

1,388

694

56

# of Households

Entry_10

918

916

916

916

916

Entry_50

2,037

2,029

2,029

2,029

2,029

Control

9,822

3,155

2,180

6,101

2,663
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Table 13 shows the effects of new offline store entry in the marketing and shopping areas
on the number of visits to the Kohl’s website. We report the results from four matching methods
as well as the one using the original data which include all the zip codes without matching. The
bottom two sections report the number of zip codes and the number of households for the five
data sets in the estimation. Please notice that some of the zip codes in the treatment groups (with
shopping entry or marketing entry) are dropped by the matching methods because there are no
comparable households in the control group. Since all the results are qualitatively similar, the
following discussion is based on results after applying the full matching method.
Shopping region entry. We focus on the effect of shopping entry on consumers with prior
experience on Kohl’s website, because the number of visits cannot decrease from zero for
consumers who have never search online before. Thus we conduct post estimation of SHPit +

PriorVisiti * SHP , which is negative and significant using the full matching method (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 =
−0.0340, 𝑝 < .01), indicating that opening a new offline store in the shopping area decreases
the likelihood of visit to the online store for consumers with prior visits during the first half year
of 2006. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis H1. Compared to the mean value of number of
visits per week to Kohl’s website for these customers before the store entry which is 0.0688, the
effect of new offline store entry in the shopping region means a 49% decrease in the consumers’
online search on Kohls’ website.
Marketing region entry. The coefficient for MKTit (𝛽3 = .0021, 𝑝 < .10) is positive and
significant using the full matching method, indicating that opening a new offline store in the
marketing area increases the likelihood of visit to the online store for both groups of consumers
with or without prior visits during the first half year of 2006. Thus, we find support for
Hypothesis H2. Compared to the mean value of number of visits per week to Kohl’s website for
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all the customers before the store entry which is 0.0046, the effect of new offline store entry in
the marketing region means a 46% increase in the consumers’ online search on Kohls’ website.
Consumer efficiency in using online channel. The coefficient for the interaction term

PriorVisiti * MKTit is significant and positive (𝛽5 =.0016, p < .10) indicating that the decrease in
the likelihood of visit is weaker for consumers who are more efficient in using the online
channel. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis H3. As shown in Table (4), the standard
deviation of efficiency is 0.3386, which means that the increase of one standard deviation in
efficiency reduces the effect of shopping entry from -0.0040 to -0.0035 (= -0.0040 +
0.3386*0.0016), a change of 14%.
Consumer prior experience on Kohl’s website. The coefficient for the interaction term

PriorVisiti * MKTit is significant and positive (𝛽4 =.0606, p < .01) indicating that the increase in
the likelihood of visit is stronger for consumers who have visited Kohl’s website during the first
half year of 2006. It is the direct opposite of our prediction in Hypothesis H4. One possible
reason is that these consumers have accumulated enough knowledge on how to use Kohl’s
website to search product information and make purchases online, thus they would use Kohl’s
website even more after the store entry in the marketing region. Post estimation of MKTit +

PriorVisiti * MKTit (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 = .0627, 𝑝 < .01), which means that the effect of new offline store
entry in the marketing region leads to 68% increase in the search on Kohls’ website for
consumers with prior online experience compared to the mean value of number of visits per
week before the store entry for these consumers (0.0917).
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3.5.1 Analysis on the Within Session Behaviors
As indicated by Bucklin & Sismeiro (2003), the number of pages within a session is
another important variable characterizing consumer online search besides the number of visits,
which represents the amount of information gained from one online visit. Thus, we conduct
another analyses to show a more complete picture of how the offline store entry affects average
number of pages per visit in the online channel. We replace the dependent variable in Equation
(1) with the average number of pages per visit, then run the similar regressions for the new
variables. Table 14 shows the similar results as the number of visits. Specifically, consumers
with prior experience on Kohl’s website browse less pages per visit after a store entry within the
shopping region, but search more pages per visit after a store entry within the marketing region.
For consumers without prior experience on Kohl’s website, a store entry leads them to visit more
pages. However, we do not find the moderate effect of online efficiency on the effect of
marketing entry.
Table 14: Number of Pages per Visit
Matching
Variable

No Matching
Full

Genetic

Nearest

Optimal

1

SHPit

0.1724*
(0.0966)

0.1751*
(0.0981)

0.1751*
(0.0987)

0.1751*
(0.0962)

0.1751*
(0.1011)

2

MKTit

0.0398*
(0.0207)

0.0312
(0.0245)

0.0332
(0.0267)

0.0403*
(0.0216)

0.0356
(0.0262)

3

PriorVisiti * SHP

-0.2789*
(0.1656)

-0.2903*
(0.1684)

-0.2903*
(0.1695)

-0.2903*
(0.1653)

-0.2903*
(0.1737)

4

PriorVisiti * MKTit

0.6059***
(0.1017)

0.9459***
(0.1211)

0.5276***
(0.1301)

0.7739***
(0.1071)

0.1928***
(0.1251)

5

SHPit * Efficiencyi

-0.1517
(0.1442)

-0.1519
(0.1464)

-0.1519
(0.1474)

-0.1519
(0.1437)

-0.1519
(0.1510)

6

Montht

Included

7

PriorVisiti * Montht

Included
244,242

151,416

Number of obs.

344,979

164,700

59

138,375

60
Number of households

# of Zip codes

# of Households

3.6

12,777

6,100

5,125

9,046

5,608

Shopping Entry

130

128

Marketing Entry

571

566

Control

2,787

694

517

1,388

694

Entry_10

918

916

916

916

916

Entry_50

2,037

2,029

2,029

2,029

2,029

Control

9,822

3,155

2,180

6,101

2,663

Conclusion and Implications
Despite the growth of the Internet, traditional stores still account for the vast majority of

retail sales and retailers continue to open new stores to gain access to new markets. Our results
show that opening a retail store affects consumer search on the retailer’s website. In contrast to
prior research demonstrating that offline store entry reduces online purchases (Forman, Ghose, &
Goldfarb, 2009; Liu, Gupta, & Zhang, 2006), our results show that store entry can both increase
and decrease online search depending on consumer-specific characteristics that affect the
cognitive costs of online search. For consumers in the marketing area of a new store, entry
increases the likelihood of visiting the retailer’s website (a complementary effect); for consumers
in the shopping region of a new store, entry reduces the likelihood of website visits (a
substitution effect). Further, we find that the substitution effect of new store entry on online
search is weaker for consumers who are more efficient in using the online channel. To correct for
the endogenous selection of store location, we apply newly developed matching methods to
select comparable control groups in our natural experiment design.
These results are important because they 1) provide empirical support for the idea that the
online and offline channels can be complements and not just substitutes (as demonstrated by
prior research on offline store entry) and 2) highlight the impact of consumer characteristics on
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the tradeoff between the costs of online and offline search. In summary consumers change their
online search behavior not only based on offline store entry but also based on the physical
locations of the entering retailer and their efficiency in using the online channel.

3.6.1 Managerial Implications
From a managerial standpoint, these results highlight the need to consider how changes in
one distribution channel affect consumer behavior in other channels and how this impact
depends on consumer characteristics. In other words, although it seems fairly straightforward
that opening a new retail store will draw nearby consumers to that store, it is not clear a-priori
that this will increase use of the website for some consumers (a complementary effect) and
reduce it for others (a substitution effect). Knowing that store entry will likely reduce use of the
online channel by consumers in the shopping region while increasing online search by those in
the marketing region, and that these effects will depend on consumer-specific characteristics that
affect the search costs, can help managers better understand and allocate online and offline
resources in a symbiotic and proactive fashion. For example, if many of a firm’s online
customers live in the shopping region of a new store, a drop in website visits by these customers
may not be a sign of trouble. Similarly, if many of a firm’s online customers live outside the
shopping region, but within the marketing region, managers should plan for increased visitations
by those customers and think of ways to capitalize on this new interest.
Our results indicate that fears about cannibalization of the online market by offline
markets may be overstated. Further, our results suggest that, in evaluating returns on retail and
online infrastructure investments, firms should account for cross channel effects. In particular,
the offline channel should be given credit for driving online search and the online channel should
be given credit for facilitating pre-purchase search that likely leads to purchase at the retail store.
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Our results also have implications for the location of new retail stores. A priori, it is not
clear whether retailers should open new stores in areas with more or fewer consumers that visit
their online store. Since the substitution effect of store entry is greater for consumers that are less
efficient in using the online channel, retailers can choose locations that have a greater
concentration of such consumers. Clickstream data can facilitate their identification.
After the opening of a new retail store, managers can better target consumers by taking
into account the consumer’s location relative to the new store, their loyalty to the retailer, and
their efficiency in using the online channel. For example, consumers within the shopping region
of the new store who are less efficient in using the online channel are better targets for the new
retail store, while those who live in the marketing region (but outside the shopping region) and
are infrequent visitors to the online store, are better targets for the online store.

3.6.2 Limitations and Future Research
Our approach has a number of strengths and limitations. Our quasi-experimental
approach, in which we look at how multiple store openings on a single day in Fall 2006 by a
major retailer affects online search at the retailer’s website and compare these changes to those
for consumers in markets where there was no store entry, allows us to control for seasonality and
other time-based effects. Our use of fixed-effect panel data models allows us to control for
consumer heterogeneity. Our use of behavioral data over a six-month period overcomes the
drawbacks of using self-reported behavior. At the same time, our focus on a single retailer means
the effects we observe may not be generalizable to other retailers. In particular, the effects we
observe may be stronger for retailers that integrate their web and retail store strategies to focus
on a single target consumer and weaker for retailers that focus on distinct consumer segments in
these different channels. Another limitation is that we only observe online behavior and do not
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have data on consumer offline behavior. Hopefully future datasets will allow researchers to track
consumer behavior over time across multiple channels.
Future research could build on our findings in a number of ways. For example, in
addition to consumer efficiency in using the online channel, other individual-level factors such as
overall Internet buying experience, income, and the need the need to “touch” certain products
prior to purchase (Peck & Childers, 2003) may be important moderators of the effects of store
entry on online consumer behavior. Although we focus on store entry, other research could
examine the effects of other interventions such as store closings, cross-channel advertising, and
new product introductions in the retail store on online search behavior.
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Chapter 4

Technology and Market Structure: An Empirical

Analysis of Entry and Exit in the Banking Industry
Most U.S. banks started to offer Internet banking in late 1990s. Since then the retail
banking industry expected to substitute the costly branch network with the far more cost-efficient
Internet channel. However, we find that the expansion of online banking did not reduce the total
number of brick-and-mortar branches, and furthermore, large, national banks expanded their
branch network at the cost of small, local banks. Using detailed data on branch location and
performance, we estimate a dynamic entry/exit model to investigate the relationship between the
technology advancement and the market structure evolution. Our findings suggest that the
advent of online banking has provided significant competitive advantages to large banks over
small banks. Specifically, large banks are in a better position to take advantage of the increasing
residential broadband penetration rate by investing more in online banking services, and hence
improve efficiency and reduce the costs in operating offline branches. Our model can
disentangle how different factors contribute to the market structure evolution. Through
counterfactual simulations, we show that the reduction in operating costs for large banks is the
most significant factor driving the recent change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by
increased entry costs and increased deposits due to greater online presence.

4.1

Introduction
Technological improvement is one of the fundamental determinants of market structure

evolution (Schumpeter, 1942a). Besides improving productivity and lowering operating costs
(Casolaro & Gobbi, 2007; Thatcher & Oliver, 2001), a new technology may also help firms
increase demand by identifying consumers unsatisfied with the current technology (Schmookler,
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1966), entering new potential markets (Vernon, 1966), or gaining first-mover advantages over
competitors (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). Following Schumpeter’s idea that appropriability
from technology increases more than proportionally with firm size, economists generally believe
that technology improvements are scale-increasing and leads to an increase in market
concentration. However, some researchers argue that smaller firms may benefit more from the
changing technology because they are more adaptive to turbulent environments, and moreover, a
new technology may facilitate industrial specialization, which can also be more beneficial to
smaller firms (Baumol, Blinder, & Wolff, 2003).
The dissensus in the theoretical literature has inspired a large amount of empirical
research on the relationship between technology progress and market structure (Brynjolfsson,
Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier & Lovell, 1990; Green,
Harris, & Mayes, 1991; Maloney, 2001; Mansfield, 1983). Interestingly, existing empirical
evidence has been mixed. According to Mansfield (1983), technology changes may lead to a
decrease in concentration in some major industries, despite that economists tend to view it as a
concentration-increasing force. Additional empirical evidence is needed to examine how
technological changes in a particular industry impact large versus small firms, and what factors
drive this impact.
In this research, we develop an estimable econometric model of dynamic discrete game in
the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995b). Using data on exogenous technology changes, our model
of dynamic entry/exit can help us address some common issues in the previous literature. First,
most empirical studies estimate economies of scale from a new technology by using a time-trend
index on cost (Daly & Rao, 1985; Green, Harris, & Mayes, 1991; Hunter & Timme, 1991;
Maloney, 2001; Murray & White, 1983) or on production (Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier &
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Lovell, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1987) for active firms in the market. They generally focus on the
effect of technology-induced efficiencies on the evolution of firm sizes, but in large part pay
little attention to the effect of technology changes on firm entry or exit, which motivates us to
develop a dynamic entry/exit model in this research. Second, the prior literature often focuses on
internal technological innovations and firms’ incentives to invest, in which case both technology
and market structure affect each other and hence evolve endogenously. Our empirical strategy
circumvents this simultaneity issue by using an exogenous source of technology change to
identify the effect of technology on market structure.
We apply the model to study the U.S. banking industry and evaluate how its market
structure is affected by the increasing penetration of residential broadband Internet connections,
an exogenous technology change driven by industries other than banking. Despite increasing
broadband penetration and adoption of online banking, the total number of brick-and-mortar
branches in the U.S. has remained stable in recent years. This phenomenon is intriguing because
it contradicts the conventional wisdom that the Internet channel cannibalizes the offline channel.
In particular, as consumers switch their banking activities from offline to online channels, the
number of branches is expected to decrease, as has happened in the book retailing industry
(Goldmanis, Hortacsu, Syverson, & Emre, 2010) and the newspaper industry (Deleersnyder,
Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002). Meanwhile, large banks are continuously expanding their
branch networks while small bank networks are shrinking, leading to a higher concentration in
the overall banking industry.
Drawing on the previous literature, we separate the effect of technology changes on
market structure evolution into three factors: demand, operational efficiency, and entry cost.
First, on the demand side, online banking offers customers an alternative channel with increased
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convenience, higher accessibility and reduced waiting time (Bitner, Brown, & Meuter, 2000;
Curran, Meuter, & Surprenant, 2003), effectively lowering transaction costs from customers’
perspectives (Campbell & Frei, 2010). Also, online banking can better satisfy customer needs by
allowing customers to have more control over the service delivery (Dabholkar, 1991). As a
result, online banking customers have been found to be more loyal with higher retention rates
(Campbell & Frei, 2010) and tend to maintain higher asset and liability balances (Hitt & Frei,
2002), which lead to an increase in market share for banks with better online services (Campbell
& Frei, 2010). Second, online banking is widely believed to have the potential to increase banks’
operational efficiency when customers switch transactions from the offline to online channel. For
example, online banking allows customers to serve themselves without face-to-face interactions
with bank employees in the branches. It is estimated that the cost to process an account transfer
can be as low as $0.01 with online banking compared to $1.07 in a branch (Hitt, Xue, & Chen,
2007). Finally, offering online banking services may require a larger amount of investment to
open a branch (Advisors, 2001), e.g., on better IT infrastructure and additional training to
employees.
Our econometric model enables us to identify how the broadband penetration affects
demand and cost factors separately. We find that these effects are asymmetric for firms with
different sizes. Although large banks pay higher entry costs than smaller banks, they benefit from
online banking in the long run through significant reduction in their operating costs and increase
in consumer deposit demand. Our counterfactual experiments show that the effect of broadband
penetration on operating costs of large banks is the most important factor driving the recent
market structure change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by its effects on entry costs and
deposit demand.
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Our research makes important contributions to the existing literature. First, we add to the
literature on technology and market structure by offering a framework that disentangles how
technology changes affect different factors that drive market structure evolution. Such a
framework is general enough to be applied to various industries, so that researchers can use it to
examine why technology is scale-increasing in some industries but scale-decreasing in others.
Second, we empirically explain how the market structure of the U.S. banking industry evolved in
recent years in response to the diffusion of broadband residential Internet connections. Our
results highlight the tradeoff between immediate investment on higher entry costs and long-term
benefit in lower operating costs. A pure myopic static model or a model focusing on production
efficiency only cannot fully characterize the dynamic tradeoff in this industry.

4.2

Literature Review
Our research is built on several streams of existing literature. First, this study is closely

related to the research on technology progress and its impact on the efficiency improvements in
financial services, which has a long history in economics and finance literature. This stream of
literature has been dominated by the estimation of cost (Altunbas, Goddard, & Molyneux, 1999;
Hunter & Timme, 1991; Lang & Welzel, 1996; Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996) or
production functions (Feng & Serletis, 2010; Ferrier & Lovell, 1990). Theoretically, these two
approaches are equivalent under certain regularity conditions, as shown by Shephard’s (1953)
famous duality theorem. Most studies in this research stream have documented scale-increasing
effects of technology in the banking industry of various countries. For example, Hunter and
Timme (1991) find that technology progress leads to a 1% annual decrease in the production cost
of U.S. banks from 1980 to 1986, and larger banks benefit more from technological changes than
smaller banks. Other researchers have found similar scale-increasing effects of technology for
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the banking industry in Japan (Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996) and European countries
(Altunbas, Goddard, & Molyneux, 1999; Maudos, Pastor, & Quesada, 1996). In contrast, Lang
and Welzel (1996) find a larger reduction in production cost for smaller banks with data from
German cooperative banking industry. Our paper extends this literature by offering a framework
that decomposes the scale-increasing effects of online banking into demand and cost factors that
drive the market structure evolution. Also, we focus on a specific technology progress, whereas
previous studies typically estimate the effect of technology as the derivative of the cost or
production function with respect to a time trend variable, which may reflect the progress in
information and telecommunication technologies, financial innovations, demographic changes in
local markets, etc.
The prior literature generally limits its focus to changes in firm sizes but, in large part,
pays little attention to changes in the number of firms in the market. It is not enough to focus
only on the distribution of firm sizes only, because firms’ entry/exit decisions are at least equally
important when studying how the market structure evolves over time. To address this issue,
researchers have developed entry/exit models to explicitly take into account the change in the
number of banks and branches. For example, Nam and Elliger (2008) estimate a nested logit
model using the U.S. banking data between 2003 and 2006. They find that bank size, structure,
and market characteristics are important factors related to bank’s branch expansion. De Elejalde
(2009) estimates a dynamic entry model to compare the operating profit and sunk cost of entry
between large multi-market banks and single-market banks. His results show that single-market
banks pay a higher entry cost, but enjoy a higher operating profit than multi-market banks. Our
research uses a similar methodology, but focuses on the role of technology advancement in
affecting different factors related to branch entry/exit, such as operating and entry costs.
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Another stream of related literature studies the relationship between IT investment and
productivity (Beccalli, 2007; Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000; Brynjolfsson,
Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Hernando & Nieto, 2007; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996), but
the results are far from conclusive. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) find that IT investment has a
positive effect on the productivity for 370 large firms. Others find IT investment has little
relationship with the improvement of bank performance (Beccalli, 2007; Hernando & Nieto,
2007). But none of them studies the impact of IT investment on market structure with one
exception from Brynjolfsson et al. (1994), which finds that IT investment is associated with a
decrease in firm size in America since 1975. One difficulty in these empirical studies of IT
productivity is that IT investment may be endogenous – more profitable firms may have more
resources and incentives to invest on IT infrastructure. To circumvent such issues, our
measurement of technology advancement is exogenous to the focal banking industry.

4.3

The U.S. Banking Industry
A bank is a financial intermediary that accepts deposits and makes loans. In the U.S., the

banking industry is one of the largest sectors in the economy, which accounted for 7.2% of the
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) when combined with insurance firms in 2013 (Bea,
2013) . With over 7,000 banks and 66,000 branches in 2013, the U.S. banking industry is said to
be the largest one in the world in terms of the number of banks. Further analysis shows that the
banking industry is very fragmented with the co-existence of a large number of small to medium
size institutions and a few very large banks.
The U.S. banking industry is also the most heavily regulated in the world (Besley &
Brigham, 2011). The key regulators include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve systems (FRS), and
70

71
state bank regulators (Saunders, 2000). Historically, the state regulators played a critical role in
interstate branching restrictions which prohibited a bank to operate across states, because a state
received no charter fees from banks incorporated in other states. In 1994, the congress passed the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (RN Act), removing barriers to
opening bank branches across state lines.
Technology has long been regarded as one of the most important drivers to the market
structure change in the banking industry (Ecb, 1999). In terms of information technology, the
banking industry represents the highest proportion of investment at the industrial level in this
country (Advisors, 2001). Traditionally, banks offer their services to customers through brickand-mortar branches. More recently, with the rapid diffusion of broadband Internet connections,
banks offer online banking as an alternative channel to branches for most of their services, such
as funds transfer, bill payment and account management. Since its first inception in New York
(Cronin, 1997), online banking has grown into a widely used tool with about 47% of American
adults paying bills online in 2009 (Whitney, 2009).
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4.4

Data
We construct a yearly panel data set for the period of 2008 to 201310, including

information on the market structure change, bank branch performance, and broadband
penetration rate in each market.

4.4.1 Sample Markets
Following Seim (2006), we define banking markets based on the concept of place from the
Census Bureau, which is basically "a concentration of population"11. In addition, a market should
satisfy the following two criteria: (1) It should be large enough and isolated from neighboring
markets, so that consumers generally do not use financial services from banks outside the local
market; (2) It should be small enough so that there are no submarkets within the local market. To
satisfy the first criterion, we first merge places with common boundaries using Topologically
Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) geodatabases for all places in
America12, because not all Census places are isolated from each other. Then, we choose
candidate markets from places after boundary merging whose: (a) largest neighboring place
within 10 miles has a population in 2010 no more than 15,000; (b) largest neighboring place
within 20 miles has a population in 2010 no more than 30,000; (c) population in 2010 is greater
than 1,400. The distances between two places are calculated using their population weighted
centroids. To satisfy the second criterion, we select places with a population no more than 50,000
in 2010.

10

We focus on the period of 2008 to 2013 because FCC began to publish tract level residential broadband
penetration rate data from 2008.
11
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_place.html
12
http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-geodatabases.html

72

73
In addition, we drop markets with multiple branches from the same bank. The two isolated
states, Alaska and Hawaii, are dropped from our sample. Our final sample consists of 1,104 local
markets. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 5 is a map of the U.S. with identified local
markets in red. The map shows that our sample covers almost all the states in the country, with
more representation of the South and Midwest regions.

Figure 5. Spatial distribution of the sample markets

We collect market-level demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The income
information is drawn from American Community Survey (ACS)13, while the population
information is obtained from Census City and Town Intercensal Estimates14. Table 15 shows the
descriptive statistics of population and income in 2010. The table shows that the local markets in
our sample are generally small, but with substantial variation in income and population.
Table 15. Summary statistics of demographic variables
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Median

Income

1,104

18,990

5,527

3,367

101,244

18,586

Population

1,104

3,723

2,993

1,448

35,180

2,730

13
14

http://www.census.gov/acs/www/
http://www.census.gov/popest/
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4.4.2 Banks and Branches
Our bank and branch level data contain information on all the commercial banks and
thrifts in the U.S. during the period of 2008 - 2013. We obtain the data set from the Summary of
Deposits (SOD) from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is a U.S.
government corporation responsible for insuring deposits, examining and supervising financial
institutions, and managing receiverships. SOD is an annual survey of branch office deposits for
all institutions insured by FDIC. It contains detailed branch level information as of June 30th in
the reported year, including ownership, deposits, and location. We use this data set to construct
branch entry/exit decisions in local markets and the performance of active branches. To map the
addresses of branches to our identified local markets, we use Google Geocoding API15 and
Yahoo BOSS PlaceFinder API16 to translate the reported text-based addresses to their
corresponding latitudes and longitudes, which can be processed directly by ArcGIS Geographic
Information System.
Table 16 and Figure 6 show that the total number of branches is relatively stable from
2008 to 2013. However, the pattern is asymmetric for large and small banks. The total number of
branches for large banks, which we define as those with total deposits more than 1 billion U.S.
dollars, increased by 4.35% from 2008 to 2013, but meanwhile this number decreased by 15.62%
for small banks. We see a similar pattern in our sample markets as indicated by Table 17.
Table 16. Changes in the number of branches for all the markets
Year

2008

2009

All banks

15
16

https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/
https://developer.yahoo.com/boss/placefinder/
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2010

2011

2012

2013

75
Number of branches

98,239

Change from last year
Percentage change from last year

98,653

97,671

97,397

96,546

95,563

414

-982

-274

-851

-983

0.42%

-1.00%

-0.28%

-0.87%

-1.02%

64,789

64,956

65,964

66,142

66,191

1,360

167

1008

178

49

2.14%

0.26%

1.55%

0.27%

0.07%

33,864

32,715

31,433

30,404

29,372

-946

-1149

-1282

-1029

-1032

-2.72%

-3.39%

-3.92%

-3.27%

-3.39%

Large banks
Number of branches

63,429

Change from last year
Percentage change from last year
Small banks
Number of branches

34,810

Change from last year
Percentage change from last year

Figure 6. Changes in the number of branches

Table 17. Changes in the number of branches for the sample markets
Year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Number of branches

2,784

2,787

2,795

2,802

2,794

2,784

Number of Entrants

62

81

55

50

54

Number of Exits

69

73

48

58

64

0.11%

0.29%

0.25%

-0.29%

-0.36%
1,253

All banks

Net Percentage change from last year
Large banks
Number of branches

1,159

1,192

1,206

1,227

1,241

Number of Entrants

41

41

30

32

36

8

27

9

18

24

2.85%

1.17%

1.74%

1.14%

Number of Exits
Net Percentage change from last year
Small banks

75

0.97%

76
Number of branches

1,625

1,595

1,589

1,575

1,553

Number of Entrants

21

40

25

18

18

Number of Exits

51

46

39

40

40

-1.85%

-0.38%

-0.88%

-1.40%

Net Percentage change from last year

1,531

-1.42%

4.4.3 Broadband Penetration
Our data on broad band penetration is drawn from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) Form 477, "Local Telephone Competition and Broadband Reporting"17. All
providers of broadband connections to end user locations are required to file the FCC Form 477
semi-annually. This form contains information on the number of broadband connections per
1,000 households. According to the FCC, an Internet access service is defined as broadband if it
is faster than 200 kbps in at least one direction. We map the Census tract level penetration data to
Census place level using weighting matrix from Missouri Census Data Center18.
Table 18 presents the average broadband penetration rate of our sample markets. To
summarize the findings in Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source
not found., we observe the following patterns from 2008 to 2013: (1) Broadband penetration
increased by 51.65%; (2) The number of branches increased by 6.53% for large banks but
decreased by 5.99% for small banks.
Table 18. Broad band penetration

17
18

Year

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2008

1104
1104

0.3419

0.1800

0.00

0.90

2009

0.3927

0.1898

0.00

0.90

2010

1104

0.4294

0.1963

0.10

0.90

2011

1104

0.4800

0.1684

0.00

0.90

2012

1104

0.5160

0.1647

0.10

0.90

http://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html
http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html
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4.4.4 Descriptive Analysis
Table 19 presents the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for bank level deposits. We can
see that HHI was very stable at the Census place level but increased by 75% at the national level
from 2008 to 2013. This pattern implies that large banks were entering more local markets
during the period.
Table 19. HHI of bank level deposits

Year

National

All Census places

Sample Markets

2008

0.0230

0.6750

0.6235

2009

0.0286

0.6733

0.6208

2010

0.0335

0.6746

0.6193

2011

0.0367

0.6737

0.6182

2012

0.0373

0.6734

0.6207

2013

0.0387

0.6743

0.6255

The primary objective of this study is to investigate how the exogenous change in
broadband penetration rate affects the market structure in the U.S. banking industry. As a first
step, we conduct reduced form analyses to find out how the increase in broadband penetration
rate is correlated with the changes in branch numbers. Specifically we run regression analyses
using three different dependent variables: the percentage of branches belonging to large banks;
the number of large bank branches; and the number of small bank branches. We include market
fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics in local markets. Table 20 shows the
results.
Table 20. Regression analyses on the number of branches and broadband penetration
% of Large Branches

# of Large Branches

77

#of Small Branches

78

Penetration

0.0496***
(0.0122)

0.1264***
(0.0260)

-0.1152***
(0.0307)

Population
(10,000)

0.1036
(0.1324)

0.4081
(0.2814)

-0.9840***
(0.3326)

Income
($10,000)

0.0402***
(0.0120)

0.0669***
(0.0254)

-0.0068
(0.0301)

Market fixed
effects

included

included

included

Obs.

5,482

5,520

5,520

R-squared

0.9452

0.9731

0.9526

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

The broadband penetration rate is positively correlated with the percentage of large bank
branches (coef. = 0.0496, p < 0.01) and the number of large bank branches (coef. = 0.1264, p <
0.01), but negatively correlated with the number of small bank branches (coef. = -0.1153, p <
0.01). This asymmetry seems to suggest that broadband penetration plays an important role in
driving the recent market structure changes in the U.S. banking industry. However, this simple
linear analysis reveals no information about how broadband penetration might drive market
structure changes. In the next section, we set up a structural model to further our understanding
of this issue.

4.5

Model
Our model allows the broadband penetration to affect the market structure evolution

through its asymmetric impact on large and small banks in terms of deposit demand, operating
costs and entry costs. We first specify how the single-period deposit demand is affected by
broadband penetration, and then recover the cost structure through a dynamic entry/exit model.
In principle, we could develop a structural model of deposit demand if we had direct
observations on prices (interest rates) and quantities (deposits). However, given that only deposit
information is available, we follow the prior literature (Berry, 1992; Singh & Zhu, 2008) to use a
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reduced form specification of deposit demand, which controls for competition effects and
various market characteristics in a static setup.
Because we do not observe bank branches’ operating costs and entry costs, we estimate a
dynamic entry/exit model to recover the cost structure of different branches. The identification
strategy is to find the set of costs that best rationalizes the branch level entry/exit decisions.
Estimating the structural model serves another purpose in allowing for the counterfactual
experiments used to investigate how the increasing broadband penetration rate leads to the recent
market structure changes.

4.5.1 Deposit Demand
To test if branches of large banks earn a deposit premium from higher broadband
penetration rate after controlling for market characteristics including population and income, we
regress the deposit amount on these market specific factors as well as the number of competitors
from large and small banks. Specifically, the deposit to branch i in market m in time period t is
specified as:

Log _ DEPimtL   mMF  1L  POPmt   2L  INCmt   3L  PEN mt
L
L
L
  4L  I (nmt
 1)   5L  I (nmt
 2)   6L  Max(0, nmt
- 2)
S
S
S
  7L  I (nmt
 1)   8L  I (nmt
 2)   9L  Max(0, nmt
- 2)
L
 eimt

Log _ DEP S   mMF  1S  POPmt   2S  INCmt   3S  PEN mt

(1)

L
L
L
  4S  I (nmt
 1)   5S  I (nmt
 2)   6S  Max(0, nmt
- 2)
S
S
S
  7S  I (nmt
 1)   8S  I (nmt
 2)   9S  Max(0, nmt
- 2)
S
 eimt

Here Log _ DEP L and Log _ DEP S are respectively the amount of deposits received by
branches of large and small banks after log transformation. We choose a log-linear regression
model according to the empirical distribution of branch deposit shown in Figure 7. The left panel
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is the distribution of deposit before log transformation, and the right panel is close to a normal
distribution after log transformation. The superscripts L and S indicate whether it is for large or
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Figure 7. Comparing the distributions of deposit and log(deposit)
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We include market fixed effects  mMF to control for persistent but unobserved market
demand conditions. The observed market characteristics include population POPmt, income
INCmt, and broadband penetration rate PENmt. The two key parameters are  3L and  3S , which
capture the effect of broadband penetration rate on the deposit demand. We expect them to be
significantly different from each other if there exists asymmetric effect of online banking on the
deposit demand for small and large banks.
S
L
Competition effects depend on the number of competitors in each type, nmt
and nmt
. 4

captures the competition effect from the first large bank branch.  5 captures the incremental
competition effect from the second large bank branch. When the number of competing large
bank branches is greater than two, we assume their competition effects to increase linearly with a
coefficient of  6 . Similarly,  7 , 8 and  9 are the competition effects from competing branches
L
S
of small banks. Lastly, eimt
and eimt
are i.i.d. normal error terms.

4.5.2 Cost Structure
Recovering the unobserved cost structure requires a structural model. Our empirical
framework starts with a dynamic discrete game played by a number of branches in local markets.
Incumbent branches decide whether to remain active in the market or exit. Potential entrants
decide whether to enter or stay out of the market. The discrete entry/exit decisions are based on
the expected discounted flow of payoffs. We learn this expected discounted value and how it
varies over different states from the observed decisions of different branch types across different
markets. Specifically, operating costs are identified from the difference in entry/exit probabilities
for branches under different market conditions, and entry costs are identified from the difference
between incumbent branches and potential entrants in their probabilities of choosing to be active.
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By examining the variation of operating and entry costs under different broadband penetration
rates, we can find out whether large banks are receiving cost advantages from the increasing
broadband penetration rate in recent years.
We model bank branches’ entry and exit decisions as a dynamic discrete game in local
markets, following the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995a) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry
(2007). Each market has a set of branches, with branch i characterized by two indicators:
whether it is an incumbent branch ( xit = 1) or a potential entrant ( xit = 0), and its type (large or
small bank). Because we do not observe multiple entrants in our data, we assume there is one
potential entrant of each bank type in each market. Each branch chooses to be active or inactive
for the next period, and then active branches compete in the local markets.
Each market is described by a vector of state variables, which determines the branches’
payoffs. These state variables are common to all branches in the market. We denote this common
state vector as smt . It includes population, income, broadband penetration rate, as well as the
endogenous market structure variables, namely the number of branches of large and small banks.
In addition, we include the estimated market fixed effects from deposit demand estimation into
the state vector because it directly affects the payoffs to active branches.
Besides the market level state variables, branches also observe some private information
that affects their profits in the coming period. They consider this private information together
with the common state vector in deciding whether to be active or inactive. The private
information may include a branch’s managerial ability, and/or fluctuations in market conditions.
We denote this one-period shock by  it (ait ) .
Denote all the payoff related observed states for branch i as a vector wit , which contains
a 6×1 vector of common market conditions (smt) and a 2×1 vector of branch status (active or not;
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large or small banks). Let ait {0,1} indicate the branch’s decisions on being active or not. The
one-period payoff is assumed to be:

 it (ait | wit ,  it , a-it )  OR(ait | wit , a-it )  ait  OC (wit )  ait  (1  xit )  EC (wit )   it (ait )

(2)

The private information  (ait ) is assumed to be additively separable. Notably while the
operating revenue depends on competitors’ decisions, operating and entry costs do not. Because
the sell-off value of an existing branch cannot be separately identified from operating and entry
costs (Aguirregabiria & Suzuki, 2014), we normalize the sell-off value to be zero following the
common practice in literature (Aguirregabiria & Mira, 2007; Collard‐Wexler, 2013; Dunne,
Klimek, Roberts, & Xu, 2013; Ellickson, Misra, & Nair, 2012). With such normalization, the
meanings of estimated values for operating and entry costs may change slightly. For example,
the estimated entry costs are now in fact “ex-ante” sunk entry costs, which equals to the real
entry costs minus the sell-off value for branches at the same state (Aguirregabiria & Suzuki,
2014).
We model branches’ decisions in a game with discrete time and infinite horizon. The
timing of the game is described as following. At the beginning of each period, both incumbent
branches and potential entrants observe the market state and draw their private profit shocks.
Based on such information, incumbent branches decide whether to remain active in the market or
exit and potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or stay out. Once these decisions
are made, active branches compete in the local markets, and receive operating revenue OR while
incurring operating costs OC . New entrants also pay one-time entry costs EC . At the end of
each period, all the state variables evolve.
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Operating revenue. We use the estimated deposit demand to derive the operating revenue
of an active branch. Specifically, we assume that

OR L (ait  1| wit , a-it )   0L   s 'mt  DEP( s 'mt | smt , a it  1) 
OR S (ait  1| wit , a-it )   0S   s 'mt  DEP( s 'mt | smt , a it  1) 

(3)

We take the expectation of deposits with respect to s 'mt because branch i does not know
how many branches will be operating at the time of decision making.  0L and  0S measure the
profitability of large and small bank branches from a certain amount of deposits. These two
coefficients may be different because, e.g., smaller banks tend to focus on retail banking services
such as consumer loans and residential mortgages, while larger banks may engage more in
wholesale banking services such as industrial and commercial lending (Saunders, 2000).
Operating and entry costs. We specify operating costs OC and entry costs EC to be

OC L ( wit )  0SF  1L  PEN mt

(4)

OC S ( wit )  0SF  1S  PEN mt
EC L ( wit )   0SF   1L  PEN mt
EC S ( wit )   0SF   1S  PENmt

(5)

 0SF and  0SF are state fixed effects that capture systematic differences in cost related
economic factors across states in the U.S., such as regulations for banking industry, tax rates,
L
S
land price, and labor costs. 1 and 1 measure the effect of broadband penetration ( PEN mt ) on
L
S
a branch’s operating cost. 1 and 1 could potentially be different from each other, implying

the effect of broadband penetration on operating costs is asymmetric for large and small banks.
L
S
Similarly,  1 and  1 capture any possible asymmetric effect of broadband penetration on entry

costs.

84

85
Equilibrium. We focus on the equilibrium concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE). Denote   { i (w i ,  i )} as the set of strategies with each player’s strategy as a mapping

 i : (w i ,  i )  ai {0,1} . Given these strategies, by the principle of optimality, each branch’s
decision process satisfies:





Vi  wit ,  it   max  it (ait | wit ,  it , ait )   Ε wi ,t1 ,i ,t 1 Vi  wi ,t 1 ,  i ,t 1 | wit ,  it , ait 
it {0,1}

(6)

  (0,1) is a discount factor.19 The value function Vi  wit ,  it  is indexed by strategy
profile  , which implies that it is the value to branch i when all branches in the same market
behave according to  . The inclusion of private information in the model guarantees the
existence of at least one pure strategy MPE, as shown by Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2010).

19

In our empirical estimation we fix the discount factor to be 0.95.
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4.6

Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss our model assumptions and estimation strategy. Until recently,

estimating a model of dynamic discrete game has been considered a formidable task. The reason
is that solving for the equilibrium of the game is too computationally demanding, and the process
has to be repeated many times for different parameter sets. To make it even worse, the
equilibrium is not guaranteed to be unique. Due to recent developments by (Aguirregabiria &
Mira, 2007) and (Bajari, Benkard, & Levin, 2007), two-stage methods have significantly reduced
the computational burden. In these methods, reduced form entry/exit policy functions are first
estimated directly from the data. By assuming these policy functions to reflect the equilibrium
outcome, two-stage methods avoid solving the game fully for every set of parameters
encountered. These methods have been applied in recent empirical works, e.g., on price
repositioning in the retail industry (Ellickson, Misra, & Nair, 2012), cost of environmental
regulation in the cement industry (Ryan, 2012), and demand fluctuations in the ready-mix
concrete industry (Collard‐Wexler, 2013). Our empirical strategy follows this tradition. In the
following subsections, we first discuss how we estimate the policy functions, and then how we
construct the maximum likelihood estimator based on these policy functions. Finally, we discuss
how we tackle various computational issues, including dimensionality reduction and the
algorithm for computing the transition matrix.

4.6.1 Policy Functions
The first step is the estimation of policy functions governing the entry/exit decisions. As
shown in Hotz and Miller (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), a set of strategies can be
expressed as its equivalent policy functions or Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs). By
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assuming the private information to follow an i.i.d. Type-I Extreme-Value distribution, these
CCPs are estimated using a simple Logit model:
p(ait  1| w it ) 

exp( wit )
1  exp( wit )

(7)

We choose this parametric specification for policy function estimation instead of a nonparametric frequency estimator because in our data entry/exit decisions are unobserved for many
states. A similar specification of CCP has been applied in previous literature (Ryan, 2012). To
make the CCP specification more flexible, we include both linear and quadratic forms of state
variables into wit . Similar to the operating/entry cost functions, wit also includes state fixed
effects. In addition, we estimate two sets of parameters, one for each type of banks, to allow for
different policies for large and small banks.

4.6.2 Estimator
Next we describe the likelihood function for our model estimation. For each possible
choice of ait , denote its corresponding choice specific value function as:
vi  wit ,  it    it ( wit , ait )   Ε wi ,t 1 Vi ( wi ,t 1 | wit , ait ) 

(8)

Here  it ( wit , ait ) is the expected one-period payoff after dropping the private shock in
Equation (2). Vi (wi ,t 1 | wit , ait ) is the integrated value function derived by integrating out the
private shock from the value function in Equation (6):
Vi ( wit )   Vi  wit ,  it  g ( it )d  it

(9)

The integrated value function is the ex-ante value to the branch in state wit before the
private information is revealed. Because the policy functions are the best responses, we can
rewrite the integrated value function as:
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Vi ( wit ) 

  p(a

ait {0,1}

it



| wit )   it ( wit , ait )  Ε   it ( wit , ait )     Ε wi ,t1 Vi  ( wi ,t 1 | wit ) 

(10)

Ε  it (wit , ait )  is the expectation of the private information conditional on the state wit
and that the alternative ait is optimal for the branch. When the private information is Type-I
Extreme-Value distributed, Ε  it (wit , ait )  equals to Euler  ln  p(ait | wit ) where Euler is the
Euler’s constant.
After discretizing the continuous state variables in wit , the calculation of the integrated
value function can be written as a set of linear equations:

Vi (wit ) 

  p(a

ait {0,1}

it







| wit )   it ( wit , ait )    it ( wit , ait )     Vi  ( wi ,t 1 ) f ( wi ,t 1 | wit )
wi ,t 1

(11)
Here f ( wi ,t 1 | wit ) is the probability density of wi ,t 1 given wit . The solution to this
system of linear equations can be written in vector form as:

V  ( I   F )1

 p(a )*

ait {0,1}

it

it

(ait )  ( it (ait ))

(12)

I is an identity matrix. F is the transition matrix for all the state variables, which
we will discuss in detail later. Given the integrated value function, the choice specific value
function in Equation (8) is readily available. Our empirical model implies that the optimal
decision is:

 i* ( wi )  arg max vi  wi ,  i    i  i 
 i {0,1}

(13)

The probability for a branch choosing to be active in the next stage can be written as:
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p* (ait  1| w it ) 

exp  vi ( wit ,  it  1)  vi ( wit ,  it  0) 

1  exp  vi ( wit ,  it  1)  vi ( wit , it  0) 

(14)

Matching this probability to our data, we get the log likelihood for our MLE estimator:





ll   log ait  p* (ait  1| w it )  (1  ait )  1  p* (ait  1| w it ) 
t

(15)

i

4.6.3 Computational Details
In our estimation, the calculation of the integrated value function in Equation (12)
involves invert the matrix ( I   F ) . Unfortunately, direct inversion of this matrix is
computationally infeasible because of its high dimension. Note that our state vector wit is 8×1.
After discretization it will result in a huge matrix that needs about 3,564GB of computer memory
to store.20 To address this high dimensionality issue, we compute ( I   F )1 for each market and
bank type, because the market fixed effects from deposit demand estimation and the bank type
are invariant over time. This effectively reduces the dimension of each matrix to 38,880×38,880,
which needs about 12GB memory and can be handled by a desktop computer.
Since we need to repeat the inversion for 2,208 times (1,104 markets and two types of
banks), we take several steps to improve the computational efficiency. First, we program our
estimation in a low level programming language.21 Second, we use an efficient open source
library from Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) to compute the inversion. Third, we
incorporate Intel Math Kernel Library (MKL) into our program, which can optimize the
execution of our code according to the specific structure of Intel CPUs and allow parallel

20

We discretize PEN into 5 points, whereas POP, INC, market fixed effects into 9 points each. The
maximum number of branches in a market from large banks and small banks is 7 and 5, respectively.
21
We use C++. Another option for scientific computation is Fortran.
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computing as appropriate. With these techniques, we effectively reduce the computational time
of ( I   F )1 to several minutes, compared to several hours with MATLAB on the same
computer.
Computation of the transition matrix is based on the discretized state space. The
transition kernel for exogenous state variables are computed directly from data. For population
and income, we assume that their logarithm transformed values follow AR(1) processes:

log( POPmt )  mpop   pop log( POPm,t 1 )  umtpop
inc
log( INCmt )  minc   inc log( INCm,t 1 )  umt

(16)
(17)

In Equation (16) and (17), we assume the autoregressive parameters  pop and  inc are
homogenous but the mean values mpop and  minc may vary across markets. Because these AR(1)
processes are highly persistent22, we use the method developed by Rouwenhorst (1995) to obtain
the transition kernel of population and income. The transition kernel for penetration is computed
directly from the observed data using a non-parametric frequency method.
The transition of market structure variables are computed based on the estimated policy
functions. Given that all players are making decisions simultaneously and independently, the
expected number of active branches in the next period is distributed binomially according to the
CCPs. For example, the probability that nmL ,t 1 large bank branches will operate in the next period
is given by:


L
m ,t 1

f (n

22

| wit ) 

nmL ,t 1

 B(n; n
n 0

L
mt

L
, p1 )  B(nmL ,t 1  n; N mtL  nmt
, p2 )

 pop = 0.9996 and  inc = 0.9656 from our estimation.
90

(18)
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Here p1 is the probability for a large incumbent to continue operating in the market, and

p2 is the probability for a large potential entrant to enter the market. Both p1 and p2 can be
n
calculated directly from the estimated policy functions. B(k ; n, p)    p k (1  p) n  k is the
k 

n
n!
binomial probability density function and   
. So B(n; nmtL , p1 ) is the probability
k
k
!(
n

k
)!
 
L
that n out of nmt
incumbent large bank branches continue operating in the next period, and

L
B(nmL ,t 1  n; NmtL  nmt
, p2 ) is the probability that (nmL ,t 1  n) out of ( N mtL  nmtL ) potential entrants

enter the market, where N mtL is the total number of branches from large banks including
incumbents and potential entrants.23 The probabilities for the number of small bank branches can
be computed in a similar way.

4.7

Results

4.7.1 Deposit Demand Parameters
Table 21 shows the results from the deposit demand regression. As one might expect, all
the competition effects are negative. For example, when a market changes from a monopoly with
one large bank branch to a duopoly with two large bank branches, the expected deposits at each
branch decrease by (1 - exp(  4L )) = 22.10%. Similarly, when a market changes from a monopoly
with one large bank branch to a duopoly with one large and one small bank branch, the expected
deposit for the large branch decreases by (1 - exp(  7L )) = 19.29%. The coefficients of population

23

As mentioned previously, for empirical estimation we assume one potential entrant of each type.
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for large and small banks are positive and comparable in magnitude. The coefficients of income
are also positive as expected.
More relevant and interesting results come from the coefficients of broadband
penetration, which is positive and significant for large banks (  3L = 0.1396, p = 0.04), but
insignificant for small banks (  3S = -0.0265, p = 0.67). Our result shows that a 10% increase in
broadband penetration leads to a 1.41% increase in deposit for large banks, but has little impact
on small banks. It may indicate that broadband consumers value the better online banking
services from large banks and make more deposits in them. Our results are also consistent with a
recent survey by ath Power Consulting, which shows that larger banks are improving their
customer service at a faster rate than local community banks over the past few years because of
their superior technology offerings.24
Table 21. Estimates for deposit demand
Meaning

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

1L

Population (10,000)

1.0183

0.5394

1.89

0.06



Large Bank

L
2

Income ($10,000)

0.0284

0.0536

0.53

0.60

 3L

Penetration

0.1396

0.0678

2.06

0.04



L
4

First large competitor

-0.2498

0.0526

-4.75

0.00



L
5

Second large Competitor

-0.3391

0.0617

-5.50

0.00



L
6

Number of large competitors - 2

-0.1611

0.0569

-2.83

0.01



L
7

First small competitor

-0.2143

0.0530

-4.05

0.00



L
8

Second small Competitor

-0.3153

0.0505

-6.24

0.00



L
9

Number of small competitors - 2

-0.2803

0.0516

-5.44

0.00

Small Bank

 1S

Population

0.8601

0.5410

1.59

0.11



Income

0.1015

0.0532

1.91

0.06

S
2

24

http://www.americanbanker.com/news/consumer-finance/big-banks-use-technology-to-boost-customersatisfaction-1073118-1.html
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 3S

Penetration

-0.0265

0.0620

-0.43

0.67



S
4

First large competitor

-0.2030

0.0541

-3.75

0.00



S
5

Second large Competitor

-0.3009

0.0536

-5.62

0.00

 6S

Number of large competitors - 2

-0.1987

0.0493

-4.03

0.00



S
7

First small competitor

-0.2182

0.0512

-4.26

0.00



S
8

Second small Competitor

-0.1847

0.0513

-3.60

0.00



S
9

Number of small competitors - 2

-0.3763

0.0639

-5.89

0.00
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4.7.2 Structural Parameters for Entry and Exit Decisions
We have estimated four models with different configurations. In model M1, we omit state
fixed effects for operating and entry costs, and set the revenue coefficients of deposits for both
types of banks to be the same (  L   S ). In model M2, we include state fixed effects, but still
keep the revenue coefficients to be the same. In model M3, we omit state fixed effects, but
estimate different revenue coefficients for large and small banks. In model M4, we include state
fixed effects and allow revenue coefficients to be different. For subsequent discussions we focus
on the results from M4. Table 22 shows the results.
Table 22. Estimates for structural parameters

1L

Penetration on large bank operating
costs

1S

Penetration on small bank
operating costs

 1L

Penetration on large bank entry
costs

 1S

Penetration on small bank entry
costs

L

Large bank deposit

S

M1

M2

M3

M4

-0.3326***

-0.3116***

-0.2969***

-0.2810**

(0.1097)

(0.1192)

(0.1111)

(0.1202)

-0.1086

-0.0750

-0.1509

-0.1119

(0.1052)

(0.1149)

(0.1073)

(0.1166)

0.5789

0.7285*

0.6231*

0.7806**

(0.3675)

(0.3859)

(0.3655)

(0.3847)

0.4448

0.0125

0.4025

-0.0255

(0.4920)

(0.5366)

(0.4925)

(0.5369)

0.0029***

0.0026***

0.0011***

0.0010***

(0.0008)

(0.0008)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

0.0007*

0.0007*

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

Small bank deposit
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State fixed effects for operating costs

N/A

Included

N/A

Included

State fixed effect for entry costs

N/A

Included

N/A

Included

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

Deposit. The coefficients are positive and significant (  L = 0.0026, p < 0.01;  S =0.0007,
p < 0.01). It is not surprising because one of the major functions for bank branches is to collect
deposits from customers. With more deposits, banks earn more profits by making loans to firms
or households, or investing in other financial products.
Operating Costs. Our results show that the effects of broadband penetration on banks’
operating costs are asymmetric for large and small banks. While it can significantly reduce
operating costs and increase profits for large banks, it has little impact on small banks. This is
consistent with previous findings in the banking literature (Hunter & Timme, 1991; Maudos,
Pastor, & Quesada, 1996; Mckillop, Glass, & Morikawa, 1996), and with Schumpeter’s
theoretical conjecture that technology is generally a scale-increasing factor to market structure
change (Schumpeter, 1942b). To quantify the effect of broadband penetration on operating costs,
L
we divide 1 by  L , which shows that for large banks a 1% increase in broadband penetration

leads to a saving in operating costs equivalent to profits from $1 million deposits.
Our results are consistent with the data from Reports of Condition and Income (Call
Report), which is filed by all regulated financial institutions to FDIC on a quarterly basis and
contains basic financial information such as balance sheet and income statement. The average
noninterest expense per branch decreased by 13.55% for large banks, but only 2.69% for small
banks from 2008 to 2013. In terms of labor costs, the average number of employees per branch
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decreased by 40.04% for large banks, but only 8.01% for small banks in the same period.25
Clearly the operational efficiency of large banks improved significantly in recent years. Our
estimation results suggest that the technology change may be an important reason.
Entry Cost. Our estimated coefficients for entry costs confirm the old adage that there
isn’t such a thing as a free lunch. While large banks benefit from broadband penetration through
the reduction in operating costs, they pay higher entry costs than smaller banks as broadband
penetration increases. Our finding is consistent with the observation that IT related investment
measured as the percentage of total assets for the 45 largest banks in the U.S. surpassed that of
small banks (Cooke, 1997). Comparing the coefficients of penetration on operating costs ( 1 )
L

and on entry costs (  1 ), large banks may recover the higher entry costs from broadband
L

penetration in about 3 years.

4.8

Counterfactual Simulations
One important advantage of estimating a structural model is that it enables researchers to

conduct policy experiments with the estimated primitives. Our primary interest in this research is
to disentangle the effect of broadband penetration on deposit demand, branch operating costs and
entry costs in an effort to understand how the U.S. banking industry evolves with IT technology
advancement. To achieve this goal, we analyze how different factors contribute to the change of
market structure from 2008 to 2013. In the following analysis, we set all effects of penetration on
small banks to be zero (  3S  1S   1S  0 ) because their estimated results are not statistically
significant. In effect we focus on the effects of broadband penetration on large banks only.

25
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Specifically, we conduct five counterfactual experiments. In our first experiment (C1),
we implement a counterfactual analysis with zero effect of broadband penetration on deposit
demand, operating costs and entry costs (  3L  1L   1L  0 ). We will use the results of the first
experiment as a benchmark to quantify the relative contribution of demand side and cost side
factors. In the second experiment (C2), we use the estimated coefficient of broadband
penetration on deposit demand while keeping other coefficients of penetration to zero, which
enables us to quantify how the effect of penetration on deposit demand contributes to the
entry/exit patterns. In the third experiment (C3), we use the estimated effect of broadband
penetration on operating costs to show how the change in penetration affects market structure
through changing operating cost. In the fourth experiment (C4), we consider a counterfactual
analysis with estimated effect of penetration on entry costs only. Finally in (C5), we use all the
estimated coefficients to simulate how the market structure evolves over time. In all simulations,
we use the observed information at the beginning of 2008 as a starting point, and simulate the
market evolution for 5 years. In each year, we compute the MPE of our model for all the 1,104
local markets.
We report the average results of 500 simulation runs in Table 23 and Table 24. Table 23
shows the entry/exit probabilities, while Table 24 shows the average number of new entrants and
exits. Because the patterns are similar in the two tables, we focus on the results in Table 23. The
first half of Table 23 shows the average exit probabilities for incumbent branches and the
average entry probabilities for potential entrants. The second half of the table shows percentage
change of these probabilities relative to the base model (C1) where the effects of broadband
penetration are fixed to be zero.
Table 23. Counterfactual simulations for entry/exit probabilities
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C1

C2

C3

C4

C5

(Base)

(Demand)

(Operation)

(Entry)

(Aggregate)

Exit – Large Bank

2.07%

1.97%

0.51%

1.92%

0.39%

Entry – Large Bank

1.73%

1.83%

6.59%

1.38%

6.20%

Exit – Small Bank

3.30%

3.31%

3.42%

3.30%

3.41%

Entry – Small Bank

1.04%

1.04%

1.01%

1.04%

1.01%

Exit – Large Bank

-0.10%

-1.56%

-0.15%

-1.68%

Entry – Large Bank

0.10%

4.87%

-0.34%

4.47%

Exit – Small Bank

0.01%

0.12%

0.00%

0.11%

Entry – Small Bank

0.00%

-0.03%

0.00%

-0.03%

Probability

Change from C1

Table 24. Counterfactual simulations for the number of branches
C1

C2

C3

C4

C5

(Base)

(Demand)

(Operation)

(Entry)

(Aggregate)

Exit – Large Bank

23.74

22.64

6.56

21.89

4.96

Entry – Large Bank

19.09

20.20

72.74

15.38

68.39

Exit – Small Bank

50.80

51.11

52.55

50.96

52.56

Entry – Small Bank

11.58

11.42

10.99

11.66

11.14

Exit – Large Bank

-1.10

-17.18

-1.85

-18.78

Entry – Large Bank

1.11

53.65

-3.71

49.30

Exit – Small Bank

0.31

1.75

0.16

1.76

Entry – Small Bank

-0.16

-0.59

0.08

-0.44

Probability

Change from C1
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Deposit demand. Because large banks may receive more consumer deposits with higher
broadband penetration, the exit rate of large banks decreases by 0.10% from 2.07% in C1 to
1.97% in C2. Meanwhile, the entry rate of large banks increases by 0.10% from 1.73% in C1 to
1.83% in C2. Given that there are 1,159 large bank branches in 1,104 markets in 2008, this
simulation results imply an increase of 23 large bank branches in the 5 years due to the effect of
broadband penetration on deposit demand. On the small bank side, entry/exit probabilities
change slightly due to competition effects from large banks.
Operating Costs. Based on our simulation results, the effect of broadband penetration on
operating costs turns out to be the most important factor driving the market structure change. A
comparison of C3 to C1 shows that, with the increase in broadband penetration, the exit rate of
large bank branches decreases by 1.56% from 2.07% to 0.51%, while the entry rate increases by
4.87% from 1.73% to 6.59%. The reduction in operating costs from online banking leads to 72
more branches for large banks. At the same time, this hurts small banks and results in a 0.12%
higher exit rate and a 0.03% lower entry rate.
Entry Costs. Higher entry costs for large banks have asymmetric effects on incumbent
branches and potential entrants. As shown in C4, the exit rate of large incumbent branches
decreases by 0.15%, and the entry rate of large potential entrants also decreases by 0.34%. The
change in the entry rates can be explained by the increase in entry costs. The change in exit rate
illustrates a nice feature of our dynamic model: because the incumbent branches expect less
competition from fewer entrants and the increase in re-entry costs in the future once they exit,
the incumbent branches will be more likely to stay in the market. Due to the small change in the
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number of large bank branches, the impact on the entry/exit rate of small banks is minimal in our
simulation.
Aggregate Effect. As shown in C5, the aggregate effect of broadband penetration is
consistent with the observed market structure change: an increase in large bank branches and a
decrease in small bank branches. In summary, our simulation results show that the reduction in
operating costs for large banks is the most important factor driving the recent market structure
change in the U.S. banking industry.

4.9

Conclusion
In this research, we propose and estimate a dynamic discrete game framework to

understand how technology advancement affects the evolution of market structure. A nice feature
of this framework is that it can disentangle the contribution of demand, operating cost, and entry
cost factors to the market structure change. When applying this framework to the U.S banking
industry, we address the endogeneity of technology investment by collecting data on the
exogenous technology penetration.
Our estimation results show that broadband penetration has asymmetric effects on banks
of different sizes. Specifically, large banks can take advantage of the increasingly higher
residential broadband penetration in the U.S. by investing more on online banking services. As a
result, they can improve efficiency and reduce costs in operating offline branches. Moreover, they
can attract more customers and receive more deposits by offering better online banking services.
Our counterfactual analysis shows that the reduction in operating costs in the most significant
factor driving the recent change in the U.S. banking industry, followed by higher entry costs and
deposit demand for large banks.
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Our research has important implications for bank managers and policy makers. On the one
hand, it may be appropriate to revisit the Riegle-Neal Act which requires that no bank holding
company can control more than 10 percent of the nation's total deposits. To the extent that the
increased concentration is a natural result of technology change, the strict limit on the deposit share
of large banks might negatively affect social welfare. On the other hand, small banks may need a
better strategy to benefit from the increasing Internet penetration. Given that the long term return
from the improved efficiency in large banks can easily justify the increased entry costs, smaller
banks can learn from the successful practice of large banks.
Several limitations of this study may warrant future research. First, we use a reduced form
approach to model the deposit demand because we do not observe branch-level interest rates and
loans. Given adequate data one might develop a more accurate model of local competition on
banking services. Second, we abstract from any network effects that may be related to the
entry/exit decision of a bank in a specific market (Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991; Mazzeo, 2002). A
model with global players competing in local markets is beyond the scope of this research. Third,
we do not explicitly model mergers and acquisitions in this framework. Future research may
incorporate mergers and acquisitions and see how technology advancement affects merger
decisions in the U.S. banking industry.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions and Future Research

This dissertation provides a comprehensive investigation on both consumer and firm
behaviors in the multi-channel environment. Our results highlight the importance of considering
consumers’ cross channel behaviors in designing firm strategies.
Although we have rich findings in the three essays, there are some important limitations
in this dissertation that deserve future research. For example, my dissertation focuses on online
and offline channel only because of data limitations. However, more and more consumers do not
discriminate between the tradition online and the new mobile channels in information search and
marking purchases. With uninterrupted access to consumers, the mobile channel offers an
exciting opportunity for marketers to build valuable relationships with consumers by identifying
their personal identities, geographic locations, and social communication patterns. Unfortunately,
Future research can extend our ideas to evaluate how consumers and firms interact in the online,
offline and mobile channels. We believe our basic frameworks, such as the nested logit structure
in the first essay and the entry/exit model, still hold after including the mobile channel. Other
interesting future research may include: to investigate how the offline store entry affects
consumers’ purchase decisions as well as information search; to formally model the merge and
acquisition in the banking industry after the introduction of online banking.
In summary, we hope this dissertation will inspire more studies on consumer and firm
behaviors in the multi-channel environment, contribute to the Marketing literature and provide
managerial implications for firms when introducing more channels.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Selection of Nest Structure (Chapter Three)
Our nest structure is chosen by comparing the model fit between alternative nest
structures. By putting form factor, channel, and firm onto different levels, there could be six
alternative two-level structures and another six alternative three-level structures. We estimate all
the twelve specifications and select the one that provides the best fit to our data. It is worth
noting that a nested logit model corresponds to certain correlation structure in the error term,
rather than imposing a customer choice process. For example, Hensher et al. (2005) point out
that “…the entire purpose in creating a nested form is to try and accommodate violation of
IID/IIA. It has nothing to do with any behavioral belief in the way that alternatives are assessed
in the process of making a choice. This distinction is very important because many analysts think
that nested choice models are a way of defining the decision process that links behavioral
choices.” Researchers have shown how a nested logit model can be developed from correlations
in the variance components without any assumptions on the customer decision process (e.g.
Berry 1994; Cardell 1997). We therefore follow Sriram et al. (2006) to use the sum of squared
errors as the criterion for comparison. As reported in Table A.1, the nest structure depicted in
Figure 1 gives the smallest sum of squared errors. We believe this specification captures
reasonably well the correlations between sub-sets of alternative PC models, and also facilitates
our study of intra-brand cannibalization within a firm and inter-brand competition between firms
within a market.
Table A.1: Model Fit Comparison
First Level

Second Level

109

Third
Level

Sum of
Squared Errors
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Form Factor +

Vendor

369.6405

Form Factor

Channel + Vendor

380.9223

Form Factor

Vendor

Channel

401.6364

Form Factor

Channel

Vendor

424.0485

Channel

Channel

Form Factor +

641.0817

vendor

Channel

Form Factor

Vendor

784.9967

Vendor

Form Factor

Channel

2702.4180

Vendor
Form Factor +
Vendor

Form Factor +

2744.0263

Channel
Channel

3011.6502
Form

Channel

Vendor

Channel + Vendor

Form Factor

Vendor

Channel

3934.1357

Factor

6133.2251
Form
Factor

15673.0967

Appendix B. GMM Estimator (Chapter Three)
GMM was developed by Hansen (1982), who proved the consistency and asymptotic
normality of a GMM estimator under general conditions. Unlike a maximum likelihood
estimator which requires complete knowledge of the data distribution, GMM only relies on a set
of moment conditions E[g(x,θ)]=0 where x represents the data and θ represents the model
parameters. In order to estimate θ, one can replace E[g(x,θ)] by its empirical analog
1

𝑔̂(𝑥, 𝜃) = 𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑔(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
and then minimize the objective function:
̂ 𝑔̂(𝑥, 𝜃)}.
𝜃̂GMM = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑔̂(𝑥, 𝜃)′𝑊
𝜃

Here, W can be any positive-definite weighting matrix. With right choice of the
weighting matrix a GMM estimator is asymptotically efficient.
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For this paper, what is relevant to us is that GMM provides a useful tool to address the
endogeneity in non-linear models using instruments. It becomes two-stage least squares (2SLS)
when applied to linear models. Note that the identifying assumption of 2SLS is the orthogonality
between the error term (ξ) and instruments (z). The same orthogonality condition becomes the
moment condition in GMM for non-linear models, i.e., g(x,θ)=ξ(θ)∙z. By minimizing the GMM
objective function, we can obtain the estimates for all model parameters, including ρlm and σjlm.
Specifically, in our model, let ξ(θ) be the vector of all error terms (ξijlm) as a function of model
parameters θ. Let Z be a matrix that contains all observations of the instrumental and exogenous
variables. Our GMM estimator can be written as:
̂ 𝑍′𝜉(𝜃)}.
𝜃̂GMM = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜉′(𝜃)𝑍𝑊
𝜃

We obtain an optimal weighting matrix by following the two-step procedure proposed by
Hayashi (2000).
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